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Abstract 
 
Judging by only economic incentives, Malaysian financial institutions (particularly 
banks) should completely ignore the Competition Act. The data show that 
Malaysian banks probably benefit from anticompetitive behaviour. Political and 
family connections likely facilitate such behaviour. Given that the Malaysian 
Competition Commission will likely lack the resources to investigate and sanction 
anti-competitive behaviour in Malaysia’s banking industry – the banks’ best 
response to the Act probably consists of ignoring it. Maximum fines of 10 million 
ringgit and revenue-tied penalties of only 10% of worldwide revenue mean that 
banks still have strong incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour and to pay 
any low fine that might be levied. The best compliance programme for banks in 
Malaysia likely consists of actions that avoid detection rather than detecting and 
preventing anticompetitive behaviour. Private rights of action are unlikely to 
provide any stronger economic incentives for Malaysian banks to adopt strong 
antitrust compliance programmes and internal audit programmes. By staying the 
course, Malaysian banks can continue to earn about 15 billion ringgits 
(approximately US$4.6 billion in anticompetitive rents). 
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The Cost of Antitrust Law to Malaysia’s Financial Services Sector 
Bryane Michael (University of Hong Kong), Mark Williams (University of 
Melbourne) and Susila Munisamy (University of Malaya)   
 
Introduction 
 
Recent antitrust scandals involving financial institutions have drawn competition 
agencies’ attention almost everywhere. Recent investigations into banks’ 
manipulation of inter-bank rate fixing, blocking derivatives exchanges from 
entering the credit default swap business and other scandals have attracted 
competition authorities’ attention. So far the Malaysian Competition Commission 
has paid little attention to Malaysia’s financial services sector.1Yet, the fines and 
public kudos competition commissions attain as a result of financial services probes 
makes the Malaysian Competition Commission’s attention to this sector almost 
unavoidable.2Investigations alone could cost Malaysian banks $3 billion – whether 
they have engaged in wrong-doing or not.3How can financial services providers in 
Malaysia ensure their agents do not engage in anti-competitive behaviour which 
could make them the target of domestic or foreign anti-trust investigations or more 
provocatively, should they even bother? 
 
We find that perverse incentives provided by the Competition Act mean that 
Malaysian financial services firms (and particularly its banks) will not – and should 
not – bear the cost of antitrust compliance programmes in the near-term. Indeed, 
problems with maximum fines and capped revenue-based penalties of 10% of 
world-wide revenue make it so that Malaysian banks have economic incentives to 
behave anti-competitively, even though this would constitute a prima facie 
infringement of the Competition Act. Consequently, such behaviour would be 
concealed from the Competition Commission and this might therefore involve 
attempts to frustrate any investigation in respect of such collusion. 
 
The first section of this paper reviews the general risk areas susceptible to anti-
competitive behaviour by financial institutions.4 The second section uses data to 
assess the extent to which these risk areas likely affect Malaysian banks. The third 
section looks at the likely effect of Malaysian Competition Commission scrutiny of 
                                                 
1 Our search of the Malaysian Competition Commission’s intended work on financial services 
includes a review of the Commission’s website and review of global media (using Google and 
Factiva).  
2 The $2.3b in fines from the LIBOR case, with follow-on suits being unavoidable, almost certainly 
represent the tip of the iceberg.    
3 We refer to econometric studies later in this paper showing that the effect of a competition 
commission’s investigation can reduce firm market value by up to 5%. Our estimate comes from 
using a market capitalisation of Malaysia’s largest banks of roughly $80 billion (in 2013) and a loss 
rate of 4%.  
4 For the purposes of this paper, we refer to financial institutions primarily in the context of banks 
and (to a much lesser extent) broker-dealers. We do not have space to discuss insurance companies, 
investment companies, retirement funds, non-bank financial institutions (like trade credit 
organisations) and others. In any case, such a discussion would complicate our analysis without 
adding any new insights into our question.  
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Malaysia’s financial institutions. If the Commission cannot (or does not wish) to 
monitor local financial institutions, then internal controls aimed at reducing the risk 
of an administrative investigation become relatively useless. The fourth section 
looks at some of the ways internal auditors can spot anticompetitive behaviour in 
Malaysia’s banks – and suggests activities internal auditors can propose to 
management based on data. The fifth section looks at the effect of Malaysia’s 
competition law on banks’ incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour (and 
to adopt internal controls against such behaviour). The sixth section describes the 
likely cost of antitrust compliance programmes in such a context. The final section 
concludes.  
 
International Cases Suggest Lax Antitrust Enforcement Likely in Malaysia 
 
Concentration (and close relationships) provides for the market power that allows 
for anti-competitive behaviour by financial service providers in almost all 
countries.5A number of measures serve as indicators for discovering the extent to 
which financial service providers have potentially used illegal means to create 
market power and/or exercise such market power illegally.6 Figure 1 provides some 
of the classical indicators that regulators, compliance officers and competitive 
intelligence analysts use in assessing potential risks for anti-competitive behaviour 
in specific markets (like financial markets).7 Such indicators also provide an insight 
into the extent to which anti-competitive behaviour occurs in developing countries’ 
financial services sector such as Malaysia’s.8 Other factors – like deregulation, 
financial market innovation, improvements in investing capabilities, and so forth -- 
may also explain factors like those in the figure. Nevertheless, the issues 
highlighted in the figure help regulators, financial services firms and their 
                                                 
5We obviously do not have space to describe the factors that contribute to the illegal formation and 
use of market power in the financial services sector. For an excellent primer on the issues (with a 
focus on the EU), see Andrea Lista, EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR, 
2013.  
6 Studies of concentration may seem passé. Economists have been discussing the role of 
concentration in the illegal exercise of market power from the 1970s onward, with limited success. 
Yet, recent events show that even such a simple measure continues to provide a warning indicator 
for anti-competitive behaviour among market participants. Durden for example provides a popular-
media discussion of how concentration studies of the credit default swap market would have tipped 
off regulators and market participants about potential abuses in that market. See Tyler Durden, The 
CDS Market And Anti-Trust Considerations, ZERO HEDGE, 22 January, 2012, available online. 
7See Alton Gilbert and Adam Zaretsky, Banking Antitrust: Are the Assumptions Still Valid? FED. 
REV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., 2003, available online. 
Also Christenfeld and Goodstein provide an overview of some of the major areas. See also Alan 
Christenfeld and Barbara Goodstein, Analysing Antitrust Issues in Lending, 249 NYLJ 108, 2013, 
available online. See also Mark Powell and Katarzyna Czapracka, Recent EU Antitrust 
Investigations into 
Financial Services – What Is the Scope for Antitrust Intervention? CPI Antitrust Chronicle, available 
online. 
8 Antitrust professionals and competition economists continue to assess whether the old measures 
still point to antitrust abuses. As the Absolt Vodka ads prosthelytize, one always goes back to the 
basics. See John Walter and Patricia Wescott, Antitrust Analysis in Banking: Goals, Methods, and 
Justifications in a Changed Environment, 94 ECON. QUART. 1, 2008, available online.  
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competitors focus their first attempt at uncovering illegal anticompetitive behaviour 
in such firms.9Malaysian financial services providers may need to worry about 
concentration, market share and co-operative agreements with other organisations – 
even if firms have achieved these positions legally.10 
 
Figure 1: What to Watch When Assessing Potential Anticompetitive Behaviour 
(or Concentration Breeds Market Power) 
 
Indicator Description 
Market share* in 
lending markets 
Banks with large shares of lending in a particular market may have the 
power to set lending rates, extract rents from fees associated with lending 
(like high document processing fees), and so forth.  
Market share of 
deposits 
 
Banks holding a high proportion of a market’s deposits may have “done 
something” to obtain those deposits.***  
Profit rates 
(NIM)** 
High profits remain the single-number, headline indicator for 
anticompetitive behaviour.  
Market share in 
market making 
and/or securities 
sales 
Dealing with the securities (rather than banking) part of the financial 
services industry, unusually high fees or high mark-ups point to the use of 
market power or collusion among broker-dealers.   
Lending/deposit 
terms 
High lending rates suggest monopoly power over money in a market and low 
deposit rates may suggest monopsonistic power to “buy” money.  
Access to banking Reduced quantity of banking and securities services points to imperfect 
competition (and thus potential anticompetitive behaviour). The “crime” part 
of anticompetitive behaviour stems from lower quantities and higher prices 
paid by society.  
Ownership and/or 
control 
Extensive ownership of financial institutions by the government, particular 
families or institutional investors can result in collusive practices across 
organisations. 
* “Market share” represents a notoriously difficult concept to define clearly. Such markets may be 
local or national and may cover specific products (like auto loans) or lending more generally. In a 
federal context like Malaysia’s, the definition of the relevant market becomes so much more the 
difficult.  
** NIM refers to net interest margins. 
*** This article’s target audience represents policymakers and educated non-specialists in antitrust. 
As such, we avoid excessively technical descriptions of anticompetitive behaviour. We provide 
plenty of references in footnotes to guide readers interested in more details.  
Source: based on Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003). 
 
Specific anti-competitive practices have appeared in foreign (non-Malaysian) 
jurisdictions’ financial service sectors that serve as potential examples of activity 
                                                 
9 As we describe later, Malaysia and other countries do not all criminalise all anticompetitive 
behaviour. Not all market power stems from illegal activity. While not all market power or co-
operation between market actors represents illegal anticompetitive behaviour, all anticompetitive 
behaviour must emerge as the result of market power or such co-operation. As such, screening for 
market power and co-operation between market actors serves as a useful scan for such illegal 
anticompetitive behaviour.   
10 We show later in this paper that they do not need to worry about antitrust enforcement in the 
short-term. However, high market shares, high fees and decisions about rates and other service 
provision which follows competitors too closely may attract unwanted Competition Commission 
attention in the longer term.  
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that may occur in Malaysia. Figure 2 provides an overview of some of the recent 
cases involving such anti-competitive behaviour.11Many of these cases involve 
collusion in respect of complex products, rather than run-of-the-mill collusion over 
lending rates or quantitative restrictions.12While no recent cases of anticompetitive 
behaviour involving retail banking have come to international media attention, 
Malaysian financial institutions can still learn from other countries’ efforts to 
identify and mitigate risks in respect of the retail banking sector generally.13These 
cases may attract Competition Commission attention to similar problems in the 
Malaysian financial services sector.  
 
Figure 2: Recent Areas of Antitrust Enforcement and Relevance to Malaysia 
 
Area Link* Relevance to Malaysian financial institutions 
Credit card providers 
offering discounts (or 
not)  
* The Commission** may target Malaysian credit card providers in 
“me too” investigations and enforcement actions.  
Making separate 
rules for banks and 
non-bank lenders 
* Islamic and other banks trying to use differences in legal status 
may face challenges on grounds that different treatment by Bank 
Negara and Securities Commission may represent unfair 
(discriminatory) regulation.   
Agreements on 
restrictions of lending 
to SMEs 
* Malaysian small and medium enterprises may challenge loan 
refusals on competition grounds (and banks may need to consider 
other factors besides risk).  
Linking data sellers 
to exchanges or 
providers 
* Malaysian financial services companies may not be able to offer 
data to close business partners anymore. Providing data generated 
through trades may require investment in data-sharing 
technologies.  
Limits on availability 
of loans and/or 
foreign exchange 
* Malaysian interest rates are higher than other countries’. Banks 
will need to ensure mark-ups on foreign exchange are not too 
high and such foreign exchange is available to all market 
actors.*** 
LIBOR fixing * KLIBOR less prone to manipulation, but banks may play with the 
host of other lending rates.    
CDS collusion * Smaller size of Malaysia’s derivatives markets make them ripe 
for non-competitive clearing methods in order to create markets 
in this early stage of their development.   
Municipal bond bid-
rigging 
* Malaysia’s growing public (and private) debt markets will 
provide plenty of opportunity for banks to collude in bidding.  
Tying loan insurance 
to loans  
* Certain tying arrangements in Malaysia possible (like anywhere). 
Yet, tying may actually help create markets in the short-term in 
Malaysia’s lesser developed markets.   
Colluding on IPO 
fees and other 
investment advisory 
* 
*
Collusion in fees for underwriting and advisory activities is 
relatively harder to detect in Malaysia, given fewer players in the 
market and limited publicly available information.  
 
                                                 
11 Lynch in particular provides an overview of the types of recent anti-trust scandals affecting banks 
and speculates on the compliance cost of these investigations. See Niall Lynch, Antitrust agencies up 
scrutiny of banking industry, LATHAM & WATKINS BRIEF, 2011, available online. 
12 We do not address antitrust issues in potential mergers and acquisitions, as these receive special 
due diligence by both participants in the merger and regulators. The Malaysian Competition Act 
makes no provision for merger control – making any discussion of such merger control irrelevant for 
our purposes.  
13See OECD, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN RETAIL BANKING, 2006, available online.  
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fees (like wealth 
management) 
Exchange of 
information through 
cross-bank 
ownership/lending 
* 
                                                
Trading of Malaysian ringgit also exposed to possible use and 
sharing of insider information. Smaller global market sizes make 
market easier to manipulate.  
* The link provides a popular press description of the anticompetitive behaviour we refer to in the 
figure.  
** The “Commission” refers to the Malaysian Competition Commission.  
We do not discuss merger (and merger control) as such activity receives heightened oversight and 
does not represent an area for internal auditor oversight. We also do not review cases pertaining to 
state aid, as the Malaysian Competition Act does not prohibit the anticompetitive use or effect of 
such aid.   
*** At the time of this writing, Public Bank maintained a 2% mark-up between buy and sell in the 
more-used currencies (like US dollars and Euro). Such mark-up do not seem excessive – given 
HSBC markups often amount to 5% or more.  
 
If the Competition Commission’s caseload looks anything like the EU’s, price 
fixing investigations may represent the majority of these cases. Figure 3 shows the 
types of cases dealt with by the EU’s Directorate General for Competition since 
roughly 2000.14Most of these cases involve price fixing (of interest rates and 
exchange rates). In terms of the financial services sub-sector, DG-Competition dealt 
with securities cases more often than other types of cases. The number of cases over 
the period does not exceed 30 – showing that financial services either have 
remained competitive or antitrust agencies have not placed monitoring and/or 
investigations in the sector as a high priority.15 
 
When the Commission decided to take up antitrust issues in financial services, such 
a focus usually corresponded with strong political incentives to take action. Figure 4 
shows the change in media mentions of competition-related stories about financial 
services in the global media. At times when anticompetitive behaviour in the 
Union’s (former the European Communities’) financial services sector became a 
significant concern, the Commission appears to have responded. Credit markets 
have continued to attract the greatest interest in the media.Unsurprisingly, the 
Commission’s lackadaisical investigations into collusion by portfolio managers has 
mirrored the public’s scant interest in this issue. 
 
 
14 We show only cases dealt with by DG-Competition and not the Member States’ competition 
authorities themselves. Such data are probably the most relevant for Malaysia – as the Malaysian 
Competition Commission will want to deal with high-value cases of a “Union” nature (affecting all 
off Malaysia rather than one state). See DG-Competition, Antitrust Cases: Financial and Insurance 
Activities, 2014, available online.  
15 The EU pursued most of these cases as the result of political pressure – with euro exchange rate 
collusion cases coming when the EU had the development of the euro as a key priority and 
expressed interest in collusion among financial institutions during and after the global financial crisis. 
For more on the political inspiration behind the EU’s antitrust work in financial services, seeBecket 
McGrath, Banking in the Antitrust Crosshairs - the EU Situation, Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge 
Client Advisory, 2010, available online. For a more political spin, see Joaquin Almunia, Opening a 
Path for Recovery: Competition in Financial Markets, SPEECH/14/108, 2014, available online.  
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Figure 4: Financial Sector Antitrust Enforcement Depends on External 
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The figure shows the amount of popular interest in competition issues, as recorded by media 
citations of “competition”, “financial services” and “EU.” 
Source: Factiva (2014).   
 
If foreign experience serves as a guide, the Malaysian Competition Commission 
will not be able to enforce antitrust law in the same way as in other domestic 
industries for several reasons. First, financial service firms (like banks) must 
comply with far more intrusive regulation than in many other industries.16 Many of 
these regulations emanate from banking or securities regulators which might 
impose their own rules that can impact on competition in the financial services 
markets.17 Second, banking regulation may purposely seek to restrict competition 
                                                 
16 Naturally, Malaysia has other regulated sectors as well. However, following the international trend, 
financial services remain relatively highly regulated.  
17 In the past, many central banks and banking regulators imposed ex ante rules preventing 
anticompetitive behaviour by banks. Such rules reduced the need for ex post checks by a competition 
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(by restricting prices, quantities and competition) in order to promote banking 
stability.18 In such a situation, the Competition Commission must focus its work on 
the regulations themselves – rather than the conduct such regulation engenders. 
Third, banking and securities markets represent particularly international forms of 
market activity. Foreign banks hold over 50% of deposits in the Malaysian banking 
sector.19 If foreign banks hold Malaysian assets (and liabilities), Malaysian banks 
also hold such assets and liabilities abroad. In these cases, the Malaysian 
Competition Commission may need to look at Malaysian financial services 
companies’ operation outside of Malaysia (though of course domestic-only cases 
will still represent the majority of investigations). The cross border nature of 
banking makes Malaysian banks open to the extra-territorial application of the 
Malaysian Competition Act as well as the activity of foreign competition authorities 
in whose jurisdictions Malaysian banks either operate or may affect.20 
 
If the EU past experience foreshadows Malaysia’s, Malaysian banks can expect 
four trends which will affect these banks’ antitrust compliance costs and 
benefits.21First, the difficulty involved in spotting anticompetitive behaviour – 
combined with market-specific factors that tend to reduce competition in banking – 
will mean few banking cases are likely to be brought under the Malaysian 
                                                                                                                                        
agency. The creation of financial conduct authorities (which hold responsibility of overseeing all 
possible misconduct by financial institutions) has removed some of the jurisdictional boundaries 
between banking regulators and competition authorities. For more on the way a consolidated 
financial conduct authority can remove the competition policy enforcement divide between the 
banking regulator and the competition authority in the UK context, see Richard Eccles, Martin 
Sandler, Michael Brown, UK: Competition Law powers of the Financial Conduct Authority, BIRD & 
BIRD CLIENT ADVISORY, 2013, available online. For a more general discussion, see James Wilcox, 
The Increasing Integration and Competition of Financial Institutions and of Financial Regulation, 
22 RESEARCH IN FINANCE, 2005, available online. 
18 Numerous scholars write about the trade-off between the gains from a highly competitive banking 
system and the potential risks to banking stability that thin profit margins and excess risk-taking may 
pose. See Todd Fishman, Olivier Freget, and David Gabathuler, U.S. And EU Antitrust Enforcement: 
What Role in a More Heavily Regulated Financial Sector? 7 COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 
2, Fall 2011. For empirical support, see Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, The Cost of 
Banking Regulation, EUI Working Papers ECO 2007/43, available online. 
19 IMF, Malaysia: Financial Sector Stability Assessment, COUNTRY REPORT 13/52, at Figure 5, 
available online. 
20See Competition Act, 2010, at s.3(1). Any discussion of the cross-border enforcement of banking 
sector antitrust rules clearly requires a separate paper (or book!) in its own right. For an overview of 
the issues, see Salil Mehra, Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International 
Consensus, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 191, 2000, available online. See also Brendan Sweeney, 
Combating Foreign Anti-Competitive Conduct: What Role ForExtraterritorialism?8 MEL. J. OF 
INT’L L., 2007, available online. 
21 We focus on the EU experience as the EU’s antitrust enforcement is far more transparent than the 
US’s. While the US Department of Justice provides cases online and the major US law firms offer 
briefings on the subject, the US market for antitrust information hides behind paid infomediaries. 
Even the most cursory comparison of the US Federal Trade Commission and DG-Competition’s 
websites will show the remarkable difference in accessibility of the two Union/Federal bodies. For 
an obvious example of the FTC’s impenetrability, see Jon Leibowitz, The Role of the Federal Trade 
Commission in Protecting Consumers, Prepared Statement Before the Committee On Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate, 2010, available online. 
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Competition Act.22 Second, international experience suggests that the Malaysian 
Competition Commission will probably focus on anticompetitive price fixing rather 
than quantity/quality restrictions. Both the EU (DG-Competition) and Member 
States have seemed to focus on price rather than quantity restrictions in the past 10-
15 years. Third, Malaysia’s financial service firms will need to spend more time 
comprehending financial sector specific antitrust regulations (and who makes 
them – the banking and financial services regulators) rather than focus on the actual 
conduct. The EU experience exemplifies the problem with multiple regulators and 
the lack of cases, as the EU’s Directorate General for Competition tackled 
anticompetitive behaviour in banking hesitantly and seemingly only in response to 
political pressure). Indeed, international experience shows that Malaysian financial 
institutions are probably safe from the Malaysian Competition Commission until 
the next banking/financial crisis as a result of the Commission’s current oversight.23 
Fourth, coordination between domestic regulators (Bank Negara and Competition 
Commission) and foreign regulators (particularly the Singaporean Competition 
Commission and EU Member States’ authorities) will pose difficulties for the 
foreseeable future – for all kinds of cases (domestic and international).  
 
Anti-Competitive Behaviour is Probably Higher than in Many Other 
Countries 
 
Banks in Malaysia appear to enjoy the levels of market power not seen in other 
jurisdictions. Figure 5 provides estimates of market power in various banking 
sectors in a range of countries.24 Market power, in this instance, refers to the extent 
to which banks mark-up rates and fees above the marginal cost of providing those 
services.25 Malaysia ranks as the 40th “worst” country --with an adjusted Lerner 
score of 0.26. Such a rank means that 39 countries have higher levels of banking 
sector market power and that prices in the Malaysian banking sector exceed their 
marginal cost (or the best possible price) by 26%.26 Such mark-ups pose three 
                                                 
22 Banking (particularly retail banking) has features which may make “natural” high concentration, 
low levels of switching, a lack of pricing transparency and large entry barriers normal. For a 
discussion in the UK context, see Cosmo Graham, Competition Law and UK Retail Banking, 2013, 
available online. As early as the 1980s, scholars argued that such natural barriers to competition 
meant that the banking sector should be subjected to more control from competition authorities. See 
Joseph Bauer, Competition at the Teller's Window? Altered Antitrust Standards for Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions, 35 U. OF KAN. L. REV, 1987.   
23 Such a reaction may represent competition authorities’ rational decisions rather than a lily-livered 
reaction to politics. Banks may engage in anticompetitive behaviour in order to boost risk-adjusted 
yields exactly at times when financial markets are most susceptible to crises. See John Boyd and 
Gianni De Nicolo, The Theory of Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited, 60 J. OF FIN. 3, 2005, 
available online.  
24See Sofronis Clerides, Manthos Delis and Sotirios Kokas, A New Data Set on Competition in 
National Banking Markets, UNI. OF CYPRUS WP 08-2013, 2013, available online. 
25 The authors specifically refer to the Lerner Index. The Lerner Index measures the difference 
between prices and marginal costs, expressed as a proportion of prices. Economists will recognise 
that this relationship also represents a function of the bank’s price elasticity of demand. We refer to 
other measures of market power in this paper.   
26 The authors use bank income as a proxy for the price of banking services and use the price of 
labour, capital and other banks’ inputs in determining marginal costs. See Id at Table 3.  
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threats for Malaysian banks (and financial services institutions more generally). 
First, whether justified or not, customers may complain that Malaysian banks 
engage in horizontal or vertical agreements which bestow such market power.27 
Second, customers may complain that banks “abuse” such market power to charge 
higher prices, restrict banking services, and so forth.28 Third, such market power 
has international effects, which prevents foreign competitors entering or contesting 
the market, thereby affecting actual and/or potential customers abroad.29 
 
Figure 5: Malaysia Ranks Relatively Badly for Banking Sector Market Power  
(as measured by mark-ups above marginal cost) 
 
The data in the figure show adjusted Lerner Index values for each of the countries shown in the 
figure. 
Source: Clerides and co-authors (2013). 
 
Banking sector concentration in Malaysia both causes and results from such market 
power. Figure 6 shows the extent to which a small group of banks (namely three) 
represent asset ownership, loan writing, and deposit-taking in the Malaysian 
banking sector as a whole.30 The largest 3 banks held slightly less than half of all 
loans, assets and deposits until about 2006. Concentration increased slightly before 
the global financial crisis. Many competition authorities and/or financial regulators 
use concentration ratios of about 40%-50% as a threshold in deciding whether 
banks have and/or are able to exploit their dominant positions. By this criterion, 
                                                 
27 The Competition Act criminalises such agreements in Chapter 1. Customers may complain to the 
Malaysian Competition Commission or to the courts under a private right of act (meaning they can 
sue by themselves in court).  
28 Chapter 2 of the Competition Act criminalises such abuse. Because market power exists, 
customers will find it easier to complain about anything that makes their banking experience less 
pleasant as a restraint on quantity/quality of service and/or an increase in actual price (including 
things like queuing times and so forth). For reports about such complaints (and the risks they pose), 
seeDaljitDhesi, Malaysian banks take heed of complaints, making huge investments to improve 
services, STAR, 25 Mar., 2013, available online. 
29 In other words, Malaysian banks become exposed to foreign competition laws to the extent foreign 
complainants and/or litigants can prove such market power affects them outside of Malaysia.  
30SeeFadzlanSufian, Muzafar Shah Habibullah, Financial sector consolidation and competition in 
Malaysia: An application of the Panzar-Rosse method, 40 J. OF ECON. STUD. 3, 2013.  
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Malaysian banks clearly have concentration ratios which would normally raise the 
suspicions of competition authorities’ that such banks have the ability to abuse that 
market power.  
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The data in the figure show  the concentration ratio for the top 3 Malaysian banks in terms of these institutions' 
holdings of total bank assets, total deposits and total loan portfolios. The f igure also show s the extent to 
w hich these holdings changed over time. 
Source: Sufian and Habibullah (2013).
Figure 6: Concentration Ratios for Malaysian Banks Show Only
Slight Increases in Concentration Lately
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Yet, concentration, higher prices and lower quantity/quality of lending probably 
reflect inefficiency rather than more sinister anticompetitive motives. Malaysia’s 
inefficient banks cannot provide all the services demanded by customers (at the 
price they want). They lack resources needed to compete in new markets.31 
Regulation – or lack thereof – also clearly has a role to play in determining 
competitive pressures in Malaysia’s banking and financial services sectors.32 Figure 
7 shows the extent of competition in Malaysian banking from roughly 1998 to 2005.  
The measure of competition focuses on the extent to which banks can pass onto 
their customers increases in input prices (like the cost of tellers, the bank’s rental 
payments and so forth). In a perfectly competitive market, banks would have no 
significant mark-ups – meaning they must fully pass-on costs to their customers. 
The Malaysian banking sector exhibits monopolistic competition – with about 70% 
of costs passing on to customers around 2005. After the regulatory changes adopted 
around 2002, competitive forces in Malaysia’s banking sector increased 
                                                 
31 A number of studies show a purported link between the generalised lack of competition and 
inefficiency in Malaysia’s banking sector. See Rossazana Ab-Rahim, Nor-Ghani Md-Nor and 
Mohamad Jais, Concentration, Competition and Efficiency in Malaysian Banking Industry, FEB WP 
1112, 2011, available online. Interestingly, Malaysia represents one of the countries with the most 
number of studies publicly available about the efficiency of its banks. As with most questions in 
economics, economists studying Malaysia’s banks do not agree on the extent to which lack of 
competition stems from inefficiency (or even if such inefficiency exists!). For some of the recent 
studies, seeIzah Tahir, Nor Bakar and SudinHaron, Evaluating Efficiency of Malaysian Banks Using 
Data Envelopment Analysis, 4 INT’L J. OF BUS. & MAN. 8, 2009, available online. See also Farhana 
Ismail, Rossazana Rahim, and Shabri Majid, Determinant of Efficiency in Malaysian Banking Sector, 
43 INT’L PRO. OF ECON. DEV. & RES., 2012, available online.  
32 For a discussion, see Muhamed Majid and Fadzlan Sufian, Consolidation and Competition in 
Emerging Market: An Empirical Test for Malaysian Banking Industry, 39 ECON. CHANGE & 
RESTRUCT. 1, 2007 
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significantly. Competition law did not increase competition in Malaysia’s banking 
system; deregulation did.  
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The data in the f igure show  a statistic w hich measures the degree of competitiveness in Malaysia's banking sector. 
The statistiic -- called the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic -- measures the extent to w hiich input prices pass through 
into bank's prices (as proxied by income). In perfectly competitive markets, banks must pass on these price changes 
fully to customers (thus the index w ould take a value of 1). We show  a range of estimates using banks' total 
revenue and interest revenue as proxies for banking prices. 
Source: Majid et al. (2007).
Figure 7: Malaysian Banking Became More Competitive Due to 
Deregulation, Not Because of Anti-Competition Policy
 
 
Low net interest margins suggest that Malaysian banks cannot take advantage of 
their market power (probably for regulatory reasons). Figure 8 shows bank 
profitability (as measured by net interest margins) for Malaysian banks since 2005. 
 Malaysian banks have consistently earned significantly lower margins than their 
peers in other jurisdictions like Hong Kong and Singapore. Lending and deposit 
rates have remained consistently higher than other countries – suggesting that 
government policy has created a situation in which Malaysian banks cannot 
compete on price as they would like.33 Lending rates in Malaysia, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have hovered around 5.5%. Yet, deposit rates in Malaysia have been 2% 
higher. Either deposit rates (basically set by Malaysia’s central bank) are too high, 
or lending rates are too low.34 Such data strongly suggests that regulatory 
distortions have negatively affected banking competition in Malaysia.   
 
                                                 
33 An extremely competitive banking environment may also explain these data. However, we have 
difficulty believing that competition in the Malaysian banking sector forces interest rates and profit 
margins to diverge from trends in two very competitive markets (Hong Kong and Singapore). As 
such, we assume (rightly or wrongly) that regulatory distortions must be at play.   
34 Higher central bank rates reflect normal monetary (and exchange rate) policy. Nevertheless, the 
higher cost of capital still appears to drag down bank profits – leading to our observation about 
regulatory distortions. We do not claim these distortions are illegitimate or unfair – simply that they 
exist.    
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Figure 8: Net Interest Margins Suggest Anti Anti-Competition Policy 
At Work in Malaysia's Banking Sector
SingaporeHong Kong
Malaysia
The f igure show s average yearly profits on bank loans (or technically net interest margins) for the countries'
banks show n in the f igure. The World Bank do not provide comparable data for the US and UK.
Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
 
Fortunately, cursory examination of the evidence suggests no obvious collusion or 
abuse of market power in Malaysian banking. Figure 9 shows lending volumes for 
several of Malaysia’s largest banks (to take a representative sample of these banks). 
As shown in the figure, lending by one bank does not seem to “rely” on lending by 
another bank. Attempts to create market power or horizontal agreements for later 
abuse often show up in data as contemporaneous or cross-time correlation. 
However – and particularly after the financial crisis – lending by Malaysia’s banks 
seems completely unrelated to lending by other banks. Simple correlation 
coefficients (shown below the figure) indicate that lending by banks seems either 
statistically positively or negatively correlated. However, no systematic trends 
appear in these data to suggest collusion between banks.  
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Figure 9: No Obvious Follow-the-Leader Behaviour in Malaysian Bank Lending
The figure show s the value of lending by several of Malaysia's largest banks. Even to the naked eye (w ithout using 
correlation, cointegration and other kinds of fancy analysis), w e can see that lending by one bank does not seem to 
rely on lending by another bank. 
Source: WRDS (2014).  
 
 
CIMB CIMB 
Group 
Hong 
Leong 
Malayan Public RHB 
CIMB 1.00 -0.24 0.82 0.99 -0.21 0.24 
CIMB Group -0.24 1.00 -0.70 -0.23 1.00 0.66 
Hong Leong 0.82 -0.70 1.00 0.81 -0.67 -0.10 
Malayan 0.99 -0.23 0.81 1.00 -0.20 0.20 
Public -0.21 1.00 -0.67 -0.20 1.00 0.71 
RHB 0.24 0.66 -0.10 0.20 0.71 1.00 
The data in the table show the simple correlation coefficients between bank lending from 2005 to 2012. For example, lending 
between Malayan Bank and Hong Leong had a correlation coefficient of 0.81. We show statistically significant correlations as 
shaded dark green cells.  
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More advanced analysis also fails to find evidence of any obvious anticompetitive 
behaviour among Malaysia’s banks. Figure 10 shows an example of several 
clustering analyses we conducted on Malaysian bank balance sheets. To describe a 
complex procedure simply, we asked our statistical software to look at a host of 
balance sheet variables (like loans, profits, and so forth) and detect a pattern across 
banks. If groups of variables (like expenses, fee income or other variables) 
statistically significantly correlated among any group (or subgroup) of banks, the 
software would put these banks into separate groups.35Without going into 
unnecessary detail, if banks formed groups which colluded with each other in order 
to compete with other bank groups, we might find similar variance in lending, 
profitability or other variables. We did not find any such results. Our analysis could 
only find one group – suggesting either no collusion or complete collusion. Given 
other data we have presented previously, regulation and other factors probably 
explain such a grouping better than any sinister, system-wide banking cartel.  
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Figure 10: More Advanced Clustering Analysis Can Not Divide Banks into
Groups According to Variation in Balance Sheet Items
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
The figure show s means for clusters using k-means clustering. We asked statistical softw are to divide the amount 
of Malaysian bank lending, profits, net interest margins, amount of commercial loans and expenses into tw o groups 
according to similarity in the variances of these items across time. If  one sub-group of banks had statistically 
signif icant variation in these items from another sub-group, the k-means clustering procedure w ould divide them into
tw o groups. The lines above show  that only one cluster has high and variable means. The second cluster 
has low  values and little variation, suggesting no members really belong to that second cluster. Our statistical 
softw are failed to put any banks into that second cluster anyw ay. 
Source: WRDS (2014) w ith analysis by authors. 
 
 
Anti-Competitive Behaviour Probably Stems from Collusion within 
Government and/or Family Social Networks 
 
For all these seemingly positive results, the ownership and control structure of 
Malaysia’s banks very likely leads to anti-competitive behaviour. The structure of 
the financial sector is the cause of anticompetitive behaviour – promoting certain 
types of potential anti-competitive conduct. Financial conglomeration and the cross-
institutional control of Malaysia’s financial institutions by the government and 
                                                 
35 We could not hope to review the literature or studies which use econometric tools to detect 
collusion or other anticompetitive practices in the banking sector. For a recent example, see Rosa 
Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert Metz and Gim Seow,Libor manipulation?, 36 J. OF BANK. & 
FIN., 2012. 
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families likely reduces actual competition in Malaysia’s financial service markets. 
Financial conglomerates (particularly those with a financial institution at their 
centre) have strong incentives to distort the allocation of capital. The IMF has 
pointed to CIMBGroup, RHB Group, Affin Group, Alliance Group, Hong Leong 
Group and AmBank Group, as financial conglomerates headed by a financial 
holding company.36 The IMF also mentioned Maybank Group and Public Bank 
Group, which represent financial conglomerates headed by a banking institution. 
Financial groups will always balance finance promotion with financial diversion.37 
 
The data strongly suggests that government and family “insider” ownership and 
control provide strong incentives for banks to engage in anti-competitive capital 
allocation (and/or favourable pricing behaviour). Figure 11 shows the share of 
government ownership and family share of such ownership of Malaysian banks in 
2003. While the figure uses very old data, the conclusion still remains correct. 
Extensive government (and family) control of Malaysian banks provides strong 
incentives for such banks to act anti-competitively.38 Figure 12 shows the historical 
proportions of government ownership in Malaysia’s largest companies (as judged 
by market capitalisation).39 In many of these cases, government held a 50% or 
greater share. When the same entity controls both the borrower (or several 
borrowers) and lender (or several lenders), strong incentives appear to provide 
anticompetitive advantages.40 Yet, how do we know that such government and 
family control actually causes anticompetitive behaviour? 
 
                                                 
36See IMF, Malaysia: Financial Sector Stability Assessment, IMF COUNTRY REPORT 13/52, 2013, 
available online, at footnote 8.   
37 Financial conglomerates, especially those with close linkages to industrial firms, tend to both 
promote and divert finance to allied firms. From an antitrust perspective, such diversion may both 
break the law as well as achieve sub-optimal economic outcomes. More worryingly, such 
conglomerates may have bargaining power vis-à-vis regulators which make the enforcement of 
antitrust or macro-prudential policies less likely. For a rather dated (but still relevant) discussion 
involving Malaysia, see Paola Bongini, Stijn Claessens, and Giovanni Ferri, The Political Economy 
of Distress in East Asian Financial Institutions, 19 J. OF FIN. SERV. RES. 1, 2001.  
38 We do not have space to review decades of literature showing how state ownership and/or control 
often leads to the anti-competitive allocation of capital. See David Sappington and Gregory Sidak, 
Anticompetitive Behavior by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and Capabilities, In Rick Geddes, 
COMPETING WITH THE GOVERNMENT: ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 
Hoover, available online. 
39See Razak, Nazrul, Rubi Ahmad, and Huson Aliahmed, Government Ownership And Performance: 
An Analysis Of Listed Companies In Malaysia, 6 CORP. OWN. & CONTROL 2, 2008, available online. 
40 Most of the studies we cite find that Malaysian government ownership of a financial organisation 
correlates with statistically significantly positive earnings and/or return on equity. Either we must 
believe that government has superior managers or that its banking managers engage in anti-
competitive behaviour which leads to higher returns. For an example of a study finding higher return 
on equity in the Malaysian Islamic banking context, see Shamsuwatd Abbas, Rashidah Rahman and 
Sakthi Mahenthrian, Ultimate Ownership and Performance of Islamic Financial Institutions in 
Malaysia, Paper Prepared for the Asian Finance Association Conference, 2009, available online. 
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Figure 11: "Insider" Shareholding Increases Risk of Anti-Competitive Capital 
Allocation in Malaysia
The f igure show s the very outtdated ow nership shares of government and families in several of Malaysia's 
largest f inancial institutions (as of 2003). Government's need to ow n such large stakes in multiple banks poses a 
serious risk of allocating capital based on administrative w ants rather than through competitive processes. 
Source: Soon and Koh (2006). 
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Figure 12: When Government Owns a Large Stake in Bank and Company, the Likelihood 
of Anti-Competitive Capital Allocation Increases 
The data in the f igure show  the share of government ow nership in various large Malaysian companies. We show  
the market capitalisation at the time Razak and co-authors came out w ith their study. 
Source: Razak et al.  (2008). 
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We cannot know for certain that government ties between banks and companies 
(and between companies themselves) leads to anticompetitive behaviour.41 Yet, we 
do know that extensive government (and other group) holdings in financial, as well 
as non-financial companies (particularly clients), creates strong incentives to abuse 
market power. Numerous authors, both generally and in the Malaysian context, 
have written about the way cross-holding affects incentives. Claessens et al. have 
noted that group affiliation (basically belonging to a group by ownership and/or 
control) in Asia leads to higher firm value, except for younger and more dynamic 
companies.42 Such groups clearly use “mechanisms” (of which some can be 
anticompetitive) to benefit their members. In all cases, common ownership/control 
dulls the learning and efficiencies that come about as a result of competition. For 
older firms, such dulling provides benefits (in the form of rents). For younger firms, 
                                                 
41 A rigorous study would correlate anticompetitive behaviour (probably as discovered through 
Competition Commission cases) with ownership and control data. As the Malaysian Competition 
Commission has just started working (in 2010), we have quite a long time to wait before scholars 
can write such studies.  
42See Stijn Claessens, Joseph Fan, and Larry Lang, The benefits and costs of group affiliation: 
Evidence from East Asia, 7 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 1, 2006.  
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such a dulling of competitive pressure deters innovation and encourages the funding 
of projects that may not have the highest market value.43 
 
Indeed, related party transactions affect some sectors more than others – and state 
ownership seems to appear in most of these related party transactions. Figure 13 
shows the value and number of related party transactions among Malaysian 
companies in recent years.44 Manufacturing, consumer goods and mining 
companies had the highest value of related party transactions. Companies with 
extensive government ownership/control have higher proportions of related party 
transactions. Figure 14 shows correlations between various aspects of company 
structure and ownership. Government owned companies had statistically 
significantly higher levels of related party transactions. They also had higher levels 
of debt – raising concerns about the anti-competitive grant of debt that may be 
given (and forgiven) more easily to government than non-government companies.    
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Figure 13: Related Party Transactions in Malaysia Point to Banking Relationships
with Manufacturing, Consumer Goods, and Mining as Risk-Areas for
Anti-Competitive Behaviour
The figure show s the value of related party transactions from 2005 to 2007 in billions of Malaysian Ringgit. We show  
the number of transactions in the black boxes above each bar. 
Source: Wahab and co-authors (2010). 
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43 Soon and Koh provide an older study, also showing extensive government and family ownership 
ties. Yet, their data fail to show a relationship between government bank ownership and harm (like 
decreased returns on assets). Se eLum Soon and Philip Koh, Corporate governance of banks in 
Malaysia, In Sang-Woo Nam and Chee Soon Lum, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS IN ASIA, 
2006, available online. 
44See Effiezal Wahab, Hasnah Haron, Char Lee Lok, and Sofri Yahya, Does Corporate Governance 
Matter? Evidence from Related Party Transactions in Malaysia,14 ADVANCES IN FIN. ECON. 1, 2011, 
available online.  
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Figure 14: Government Involvement in Malaysian Companies Clearly Has an 
Effect on Related Party Transactions and Other Company Factors 
 
Factor Family Government 
Number of related party transactions * positive 
Assets in related party transactions negative * 
Proportion of independent board directors * * 
Number of directors on Board positive * 
Audited by Big 4 * *  
Assets   negative * 
Debt negative positive 
Number of interlocking directors positive * 
The figure shows the extent to which family and government ownership correlates with the factors 
shown in regression analysis. “Positive” indicates a positive correlation and “negative” indicates a 
negative one.  
Source: Wahab et al. (2010).  
 
We know that government ownership – and the related party transactions such 
ownership and control brings – sometimes leads to unethical and/or illegal 
behaviours. For example, Ali and co-authors find that when managers own 
Malaysian companies, these companies tend to experience more earnings 
management.45 Such findings probably also apply to state owners who also manage 
Malaysian companies. For their part, Munir and co-authors show that related party 
transactions negatively associate with firm performance. Clearly, untoward 
behaviour explains such a relationship – as family firms exhibit stronger losses 
related to such transactions than non-family firms.46 When these studies are taken 
together, they point to state and family related party transactions that probably 
decrease firm value through distortionary, preferential trading and finance decisions. 
Other authors have gone further to argue that common ownership and control has 
led to state-supported “cronyism.”47 
 
Such “cronyism” clearly has affected Malaysia firms’ finance in the past. Authors 
like Faccio have found evidence, with reference to Malaysia, that banks tend to 
allocate capital to politically connected firms – the very definition of anti-
competitive behaviour.48 Previous forced bank mergers have favoured the 
politically connected – also favouring anti-competitive behaviour.49 Figure 15 
illustrates the likely distortionary (if not anticompetitive) nature of state 
                                                 
45See Salsiah Ali, Norman  Salleh and Mohamat Hassan, Ownership Structure and Earnings 
Management in Malaysian Listed Companies: The Size Effect, 1 ASIAN J. OF BUS. AND ACCOUNT. 2, 
2008, available online. 
46See Sa'adiah Munir and Reza Jashen Gul, Related Party Transactions, Family Firms and Firm 
Performance: Some Malaysian Evidence, Finance and Corporate Governance Conference 2011 
Paper, 2010, available online.  
47See Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton, Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from Malaysia, 67 
J. OF FIN. ECON. 2, 2003. 
48See Mara Faccio, Politically Connected Firms, 96 AMER. ECON. REV. 1, 2006, available online.  
49 See Beng-Soon Chong, Ming-Hua Liu, and Kok-Hui Tan, The wealth effect of forced bank 
mergers and cronyism, 30 J. OF BANK. & FIN. 11, 2006, available online.       
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participation in Malaysia’s economy and its effects on bank lending. Malaysian 
firms owned by the government had higher leverage (meaning more bank credit), 
larger asset sizes (assets bought with more equity, debt or revenue) but lower share 
premia than non-government owned companies. Higher borrowing, combined with 
lower valuations, suggests that shareholders do not think these firms got more credit 
than they deserve/need. Firms with political connections also had higher leverage. 
However, their share premia exceeded those of firms without such connections. 
Investors clearly value politically connected Malaysian firms for the likely 
advantages (funding, sales and other) such connections afford.  
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The figure show s the w ay that government ow nership and ties to politicians affects the leverage (borrow ing), asset 
sizes, returns on assets, precent investment in plant and share premia of Malaysian companies. Leverage is defined as
total debt divided by total assets. Asset size equals the log of asset book value. Return on assets equals pretax profits 
divided by total assets. Percent in plant equals property, plant and machinery assets expressed as a percet of total 
assets, and share premia equals market price of shares divided by shareholders equity per share. The solid bars 
represent relationships statistically signif icant at the 1% level. 
Source: Fraser et al . (2006). 
Figure 15: Government Ownership and Ties to Politicians Clearly Affects 
Lending and Asset Sizes 
 
 
What do these data mean for bank compliance and audit staff interested in the 
potential enforcement of Malaysia’s competition law? If political and family 
connections really do increase the risk of anticompetitive behaviour, then auditors 
need to assess the risks that such anticompetitive behaviour (or perceived 
anticompetitive behaviour) may pose to their employers’ banks. Figure 16illustrates 
some of the implications for internal auditors of anticompetitive behaviour driven 
by common government, political or family control.50 We present many of the 
actions bank management and auditors can take now, offering justification for any 
of these actions in subsequent sections.  
                                                 
50 We assume that such political connections and state ownership do not distort the incentives of 
internal auditors. Empirical evidence finds higher audit fees charged for politically connected firms 
than for unconnected firms. See Effiezal Wahab, Mazlina Zain, Kieran James, and Hasnah Haron, 
Institutional investors, political connection and audit quality in Malaysia, 22 ACC. RES. J. 2, 2009.   
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Figure 16: What do the anticompetitive incentives related to government and family 
ownership mean for antitrust risk controls and the audit of Malaysia’s financial firms? 
 
If you believe the literature (that government and family control of company groups) raises 
the risk of anticompetitive behaviour, several implications follow. Companies under 
government or family control need to put in more controls to prevent, detect and punish 
anticompetitive behaviour. Auditors need to keep the results of this literature in mind as 
they assess risks and look for harmful conduct.  
 
For bank directors: 
• make statements in public about any warnings, investigations, or questionings by Bank 
Negara or the Competition Commission as a way of helping the entire industry assess 
the likelihood of future enforcement in this area,  
• have explicit signoff by compliance or risk management group when dealing with 
clients (or prospects) under common ownership, 
• start a hotline, where customers can complain about perceived anticompetitive 
behaviour BEFORE they take it to the Competition Commission, 
• put the rationale for major competitive decisions related to lending practices in writing, 
making reference to the market-driven reason for the move, 
• when writing up the rationale for commercial decisions, have a space on the confidential 
write-up form called “antitrust issues,” where the writer describes what he or she did to 
consider the antitrust aspects of the decision – and what he or she found. 
For auditors: 
• decide every year when creating the risk-based annual audit plan if the risk of 
Competition Commission investigation warrants an antitrust internal audit, 
• decide if state ownership/control, political connections and family control increase or 
decrease the likelihood of Competition Commission investigation,*  
• monitor the press for investigations as way of deciding on risk levels (during annual 
planning) and thus if controls are adequate (during an engagement),  
• focus on parts of the business outside Malaysia (or with effects outside of Malaysia), 
• include the risk of private lawsuits (rights of private action) as well as Competition 
Commission enforcement when analysing antitrust risk.  
 
* The literature produces ambivalent results related to the effect of state ownership and political 
connections on the likelihood of Competition Commission investigation. On the one hand, the 
probability of anticompetitive behaviour may increase. On the other hand, such connectedness may 
help shield companies from Commission oversight.   
Source: authors.  
Malaysian Competition Commission Scrutiny Probably Will Not Have a 
Significant Effect 
 
At first glance, Malaysian law clearly prohibits the anti-competitive behaviour we 
showed occurred in the US and EU as a “concerted practice.”51 The range of 
practices we reviewed above in other countries tends to fall under only two 
provisions in the Competition Act – restrictions on horizontal and vertical 
                                                 
51Competition Act, Act 712, 2010, at 2, available online.  
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agreements and abuse of market power.52 Under Malaysian law, banking and 
securities brokering do not fall into any of the exemptions explicitly listed in the 
Competition Act.53 The2013 Financial Services Act further specifically mentions 
“prohibited business conduct” which includes anticompetitive behaviour.54 Both 
statutes thus clearly and specifically apply Malaysia’s competition regime to 
financial services – leaving little doubt about the legislature’s intent to apply the 
country’s antitrust laws to financial services. If these provisions mean anything at 
all, Malaysia’s financial institutions should start preparing for the same kind of 
antitrust regime operating in other jurisdictions like the US and EU.  
 
However, a number of factors suggest that the Malaysian competition regime will 
probably not operate like those of other countries in the short to medium term. The 
relationship between provisions in the Competition Act and Financial Markets Act 
represents one of those factors. Notably, courts might take a limited view of 
anticompetitive behaviour to cover only behaviours mentioned in Schedule 7 of the 
2013 Financial Services Act.55 Such conduct includes “exerting undue pressure on, 
or coercing, a financial consumer to acquire any financial service or product as a 
condition for acquiring another financial service or product.”56 Such conduct also 
includes “colluding with any other person to fix or control the features or terms of 
any financial service or product to the detriment of any financial consumer, except 
for any tariff or premium rates or policy terms which have been approved by the 
Bank.”57 Such behaviour leaves out many aspects of the illegal formation of 
horizontal and vertical agreement and abuse of market power mentioned in the 
Competition Act. However, such an interpretation is unlikely – as legislators could 
have simply added an exemption for financial services directly in the Competition 
Act. However, if politics and other factors are able to sway judicial interpretation, 
we must allow for such a possibility.  
 
Even assuming that the broader provisions of the Competition Act apply (rather 
than the restrictive conditions mentioned in the Financial Services Act), we still do 
not know the extent to which actual anticompetitive behaviour in the financial 
services sector would infringe on the Competition Act. In other words, do the 
prohibitions in the Competition Act outlaw the actual anticompetitive behaviour 
that most regulators seek to prevent and/or punish?  
 
                                                 
52Id at chap 1 and 2 respectively.  
53 Exempted sectors, as mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Act, include the communications and energy 
sectors. Other exempted activities – as defined in art 3(4) -- include, charity and other social 
activities.   
54 Financial Services Act of 2013, at 124, available online. The article specifically requires that a, 
“financial service provider shall not engage in any prohibited business conduct set out in Schedule 
7.” Schedule 7, for its part, lists anticompetitive behaviours forbidden under the Financial Services 
Act.  
55See Id at Schedule 7.   
56Id at Schedule 7, art. 5. 
57 Id at art. 6.  
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The Competition Act basically defines only two broad offences – anticompetitive 
horizontal and vertical agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Figure 17 
shows the range of actual antitrust violations from the US which clever Competition 
Commission staff might shoehorn into each category. There is no guarantee that the 
Competition Commission will view all the offences we have binned into the broad 
categories listed in the figure as infractions in Malaysia. In other words, the 
Competition Commission might not view activities which are anti-trust violations in 
the US or EU as infractions under Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of the Malaysian 
Competition Act.58 Much will depend on the, as yet, unwritten Guidance that will 
ultimately aid the communities understanding of what the Commission considers to 
be unlawful. As such, the range of activities that bank managers should control for, 
and that internal auditors should audit for, remains uncertain. 
 
Figure 17: Do the Competition Act’s Broad Labels Really Criminalise the 
Panoply of Anti-Competitive Behaviours Likely to Occur in the Malaysian 
Financial Services Sectors? 
 
Malaysian law Foreign law 
Prohibition on 
horizontal and 
vertical agreements 
Cartel agreements, restrictive practices, exclusive dealing, price fixing, bid 
rigging, market sharing, group boycotts, restraints of trade, tacit collusion, 
vertical restraints, resale price maintenance, unilateral policies, “excessive” 
horizontal integration, “excessive” vertical integration, price 
discrimination, and tying. 
Prohibition on abuse 
of dominant position 
monopolisation, abuse of a dominant position, predatory pricing. 
Source: authors (based on Graham and Richardson, 1997). 
 
Even assuming that the current legislation completely and adequately covers the 
anticompetitive behaviour the Parliament targeted, we have no guarantee that the 
financial services sector would not qualify for a block exemption in the future.59 
Financial service firms could apply for a block exemption – hoping to carve out 
such an exemption that would let them engage in legal anticompetitive behaviour in 
the future.60 Moreover (and even less likely) individual banks may apply to the 
Competition Commission for individual exemptions.61 
 
Malaysian banks may seek – with highly unlikely prospects of success – to use the 
Act’s defences in cases to defend already existing anticompetitive behaviour that is 
                                                 
58 A particular cause for difference between regulators’ views about anticompetitive behaviour might 
come from differences in the application of Malaysian (versus US and EU law). Malaysian law 
focuses on the conduct – whereas US and EU law make much more allowance for anticompetitive 
effect. Basically, the Competition Act makes unlawful any horizontal agreement between firms 
seeking to fix prices, share markets, limit control of economic factors of production or rig bids (as 
automatically having the object to restrict competition). See Competition Act at s.4(2).    
59Id at art. 8.  
60 Such block exemptions for financial services do not receive wide support from the European 
Commission. However, suspensions of EU antitrust law (in the form of block exemptions)  have 
been given in relation to state aid to banks and other financial service providers during the financial 
crisis.   
61Id at s. 6.  
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prohibited by section 4 of the Act. In particular, the Competition Act allows for an 
enterprise to be relieved of its liability under section 4 if “there are significant 
identifiable, technological, efficiency or social benefits directly arising from the 
agreement [that the enterprise is a party to]”.62 Figure 18 shows the conditions 
under which anticompetitive behaviour may escape liability. One could easily 
imagine a bank (or banking association) arguing – with an unlikely chance of 
success -- that most if not all banking activity exhibits all four features presented in 
the figure.63 Indeed, a number of countries have previously exempted financial 
services from antitrust enforcement on public policy grounds.64 A recent UNCTAD 
report notes that, “although in many jurisdictions financial institutions are 
completely exempted from the purview of competition legislation on the grounds of 
‘systemic stability’ or the ‘specialized nature of the industry’, there are no sound 
economic reasons for doing so. Given the central role played by financial 
intermediation, savings and investment in the economic development process, it is 
important to ensure a competitive financial services industry.”65As such, the 
possibility of exempting the financial services sector, in whole or in part, from 
the Competition Act entirely makes the task of an internal audit of application 
of antitrust rules to Malaysian banks difficult.66 
 
Figure 18: Malaysian Financial Services Getting Ready for a Bloc Exemption? 
 
Requirement for exemption Possible argument 
There are significant identifiable 
technological, efficiency or social benefits 
directly arising from the agreement; 
The Competition Act will lower profitability too 
much. Competition reduces profits which go toward 
Malaysian banks’ capitalisation, liquidity, and 
incentive to save costs, create new products and so 
forth.  
The benefits could not reasonably have 
been provided by the parties to the 
agreement without the agreement having 
the effect of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition; 
Restrictions of competition provide the easiest and 
most transparent way of promoting banking 
stability – as other arrangements (like providing 
emergency funding, using monetary policy and so 
forth) are more expensive and less certain.   
The detrimental effect of the agreement 
on competition is proportionate to the 
As the 2008 crisis showed, banking stability can help 
the entire economy. Anti-competitive behaviour only 
                                                 
62Id at s. 5. The conditions in section 5 relate to a series of conditions often found in antitrust 
legislation which promote consumer welfare and technological innovation. We describe these 
conditions in more detail in the figure mentioned in the text.  
63 Section 5 identifies the conditions under which banks may seek exemption from the Act either as a 
group or as individuals. Section 6 describes the conditions for seeking relief from a Competition 
Commission enforcement action as an individual entity. Section 8 and 9 describe the conditions 
under which banks may seek relief as a group.  
64Dauboin provides an interesting description of France’s exemption of financial services from its 
own antitrust rules and compares with the US. Naturally, EU antitrust law continues to apply. See 
Adeline Dauboin, The Application of Antitrust Law to Banking and Financial Companies, In Martin 
Rogoff, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: FRENCH AND AMERICAN RESPONSES, available online.  
65ShyamKhemani, Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions, 2002, available 
online. at p. 31.  
66 Admittedly, this represents self-induced uncertainty. Representatives of the banking sector would 
need to apply for such an exemption, with some banks likely taking a passive or non-existent role in 
militating for the exemption.  
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benefits provided; and impacts on a few, and only causes consumers to 
become slightly poorer.   
The agreement does not allow the 
enterprise concerned to eliminate 
competition completely in respect of a 
substantial part of the goods or services. 
Setting price, quantity and even quality restrictions 
collectively (by the bank association for example) 
still allows for market entry, stealing market share 
and so forth.  
Source: Malaysian Competition Act at Section5 (with analysis by authors). 
 
Uncertainty about the application of subsidiary regulation creates almost as much 
uncertainty for Malaysia’s banks and financial firms as unpredictability about the 
types of offences and organisations covered. Which government body holds the 
competencies for antitrust rulemaking for financial firms in Malaysia? At least three 
agencies have the power to draft competition-related regulations affecting banks. 
First, the Bank Negara can “issue guidance in writing on (a) descriptions of conduct 
which amount to [anticompetitive behaviour] and/or (b) factors that are to be taken 
into account in determining whether a financial service provider has engaged in 
[anticompetitive behaviour].”67 Such guidance “shall be issued in consultation with 
the Competition Commission.”68 Second, the Minister of Domestic Trade and 
Consumer Affairs may pass regulations which “giv[es] full effect to the 
provisions…, carr[ies] out or achiev[es] the objects and purposes…and provid[es] 
for any supplemental, incidental or consequential matters in relation to this Act.”69 
Third, the Competition Commission (of course) “may issue and publish such 
guidelines as may be expedient or necessary for the better carrying out of the 
provisions of [the Competition Act].”70 At first glance, primary legislation does not 
assign supremacy or primary responsibility with any one of these agencies.71 The 
presence of multiple potential regulators – and questions about jurisdictional 
overlaps between them –makes the creation and audit of antitrust rules inside 
Malaysian banks difficult. Without going too far off topic, we provide a draft 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank Negara and the Competition 
                                                 
67 Financial Services Act, s.124(2). We have replaced “any prohibited business conduct set out in 
Schedule 7” in the original with the phrase “anticompetitive behaviour,” as this relates to the 
anticompetitive behaviour mentioned in Schedule 7.  
68 Financial Services Act at s.124(3), underlining ours. We take “shall” to mean an imperative like 
“must.” However, given that the powers of the Commission to refuse such rulemaking does not 
appear in the Act, such a “shall” probably represents “should” in practice.  
69 Competition Act at s.65(1). We have removed the lettered-list formatting in the original for 
readability.  
70 Competition Act at s.66(1). Interestingly, the use of the word (at least in the English version of the 
Act) “may” represents an conditional right. In contrast, the Financial Services Act (as we have noted 
above) imposes a definite obligation “shall” on the Bank Negara to make such rules. To our mind, 
this creates a hierarchy of obligations and administrative entitlement – with central bank rulemaking 
superseding the Competition Commission’s.    
71 We have provided, in the previous footnote, an extremely flimsy basis for establishing the Bank 
Negara’s supremacy over such rulemaking for the financial services sector. Whether the slight 
difference in “shall” versus “may” justifies assigning the Bank Negara with primary responsibility 
for such rulemaking or assigning it blame when/if such rulemaking fails to curb collusion and anti-
competitive behaviour represents an entirely different matter.  
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Commission in Appendix I to resolve this problem – and thus help internal auditors 
in Malaysia’s banks.72 
 
In any case, from a risk-based perspective, the Competition Commission will have 
little interest in monitoring anticompetitive behaviour in banking, as a sub-sector of 
the wider financial services sector. Figure 19 shows the size (as measured by the 
value of financial assets) of the various types of Malaysian financial service sectors. 
Under a risk-based approach to antitrust monitoring and supervision, the Malaysian 
Competition Commission will allocate market review and investigation manpower 
and resources based on the probability of anticompetitive behaviour and the value 
of the harm any likely anti-competitive behaviour causes.73 As shown, equities’ 
values eclipse other types of financial assets -- including loans and savings. Private 
credit does represent a fairly substantial part of GDP. However, given the size of 
the country’s equity and debt markets, the Bank Negara (working with the 
Securities Commission) and the Competition Commission would – and should – 
focus on securities and stock-brokers more than banks. Malaysian bank executives 
can rationally assume that the Competition Commission will place a low 
priority on detecting, investigating and sanctioning banking sector 
anticompetitive behaviour.74 
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The f igure show s the value of f inancial assets in Malaysia's f inancial system (expressed as a percent of GDP). 
Public and private debt together w eigh in at about the amount of private credit, and equity market values equal 
roughly the size of debt markets broadly-defined. 
Source: IIMF (2014). 
private credit
equity market
 
 
                                                 
72 Having greater regulatory clarity and certainty helps lower the costs and increase the effectiveness 
of internal audit. Having one rulemaking body reduces time searching for rules and reduces chances 
of conflicting rules which would make corporate anti-trust rules harder to write.  
73 Readers with an economics background will recognise that this means the Malaysian Competition 
Commission should maximise the “inter-temporal, probabilistic expected value” of gains from 
antitrust investigations and prosecutions.  While the Commission probably won’t run as neo-
classical economists might like, such a paradigm still represents the best method companies can use 
to guess where the Commission will allocate its scarce supervisory and enforcement resources. See 
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, UC COASE-SANDOR 
INST. FOR L. & ECON. RES. 660, available online. 
74 We use the word “rationally” in the economic sense of the term. Rational behaviour, to an 
economist, means that the costs of engaging in large amounts of monitoring likely exceed the 
probability-weighted likely benefits of such monitoring. Thus, the Competition Commission should 
rationally engage in very little monitoring, catching only the cheapest, easiest to spot cases.  
 26
Even if the Competition Commission wanted to detect anticompetitive behaviour 
among Malaysia’s banking institutions, its staff’s lack of quantitative skills 
probably makes the organisation unable to engage in serious oversight. A review of 
the Commission’s staffing shows only one department even potentially capable of 
mining the data needed to spot anticompetitive behaviour.75 Lack of serious 
econometric studies conducted by the admittedly very young competition authority 
demonstrates such a lack of capacity – though its capacity may be enhanced in the 
future (see Figure 20).76 As we have previously mentioned, Commission officials 
have not made any statements in public (at least translated into English) about their 
interest in monitoring the financial sector. And the most relevant area affecting 
competition between Malaysia’s banks (mergers and merger control) remains 
unregulated.77Given recent announcements that the government wishes to further 
encourage “consolidation” in Malaysia’s banking sector, lack of focus on this high-
risk area shows lack of interest in regulating anti-competitive behaviour among 
Malaysian banks.78Malaysian bank directors -- and the internal auditors who 
work for them – may thus rationally assume that the Competition Commission 
will engage in little oversight of the banking sector for the foreseeable future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 The Commission’s website lists Komala Veeriah as the sole contact in the Commission’s 
economics unit. His work in the public domain shows knowledge of quantitative methods – though 
not enough to do the kind of serious econometrics needed to detect anticompetitive behaviour in 
Malaysia’s banking system. Among Commission members themselves, only Prof. Hasnah Haron 
seems to have the quantitative background needed to understand the kinds of statistical methods 
needed.  
76 Publication of fancy econometric and data mining studies does not necessarily establish a 
competition agency’s capacity – as many such agencies do not publish their market reviews. In the 
short term, the Malaysian Competition Commission could outsource such studies, much like the EU 
does. See EU DG-Competition, Interim Report II Current Accounts And Related Services: Sector 
Inquiry under Article 17 Regulation 1/2003, 2006, available online. 
77 The Competition Act makes no mention of merger control (leaving mergers and acquisitions 
unregulated by the Act) and the Commission has no specific department (of course) dealing with 
mergers.  
78See Scott Hamilton, Malaysian Central Bank Governor Says Bank Mergers Would Be Good, 
BLOOMBERG, 1 July, 2011, available online. 
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Figure 20: Will Malaysia’s Competition Law Become More Effective Over 
Time? 
 
The Malaysian Competition Commission has not yet celebrated its fifth birthday. Can we 
expect the Commission will monitor and enforce antitrust law in/among Malaysia’s 
financial institutions better than it does now? The evidence suggests yes. As shown in the 
figure, market power exercised by banks across countries tends to fall as more time passes 
since the adoption of that country’s competition law.79 If Malaysia follows these cross-
country trends, the Competition Commission will need to operate 30 more years in order to 
witness a halving of the market power currently exercised by Malaysia’s banks.80 Yet, this 
data give hope that the operation of a competition authority does correlate with greater 
banking sector competition.  
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Even if the Competition Commission manages to solve all these issues and obtain 
the econometric skills needed to detect anticompetitive behaviour among 
Malaysia’s banks, the Price Control and Anti-Profiteering Act may cause banks to 
conceal evidence of possession or use of market power.81 The Price Control Act 
(for short) gives the Minister for Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs the right to 
appoint a Price Controller who may set the price of “any services.”82 The Price 
Control Act also criminalises profiteering – or setting “profit unreasonably high.”83 
The Minister for Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs may use whatever criteria 
or method he or she pleases to determine if banks and other service providers earn 
                                                 
79 See Franz Kronthaler, Effectiveness of Competition Law: A Panel Data Analysis, INST. FOR ECON. 
RES. DP, 2007, available online. 
80 We say “witness” because these data in no way necessarily imply causality. In other words, we 
can not be sure that market power exercised by each country’s banks depends on the operation of 
that country’s competition authority. To make such a conclusion, we would need to filter out (or 
“control for” in the language of economics) the effects of banking regulations, macroeconomic 
factors, and a range of other factors.  
81See Price Control and Anti-Profiteering Act 2011, Act 723, available online. 
82Id at art. 5(a).  
83Id at 14(2).  
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exceedingly high profits.84 Such a legal provision provides to banks an extremely 
strong incentive to hide profits to avoid attracting attention and potential sanctions 
under the profiteering rules. In other words, Malaysian banks have strong incentives 
to develop and use market power to obtain profits -- which they then need to hide 
through various accounting, spending and other programmes. Such concealment 
makes the detection of anticompetitive behaviour using econometric and statistical 
methods even more difficult. As such, the Price Control and Anti-Profiteering Act 
is likely to contribute to anticompetitive behaviour rather than reduce it. 
 
All these factors mean three things for internal auditors. First, bank managers (and 
thus internal auditors) will rationally put off adopting antitrust controls because they 
face legal uncertainty for the reasons we have just described. In particular, because 
of this uncertainty Malaysian bank managers will have little incentive to create their 
own internal rules which might (or might not) address the broad infractions defined 
in the Competition Act. Second, the Competition Commission (and to a lesser 
extent the Bank Negara) is highly unlikely to detect anticompetitive behaviour by 
banks in the next 5-10 years. Specifically, deficiencies in both the Commission’s 
political will to enforce the Act and its ability to undertake serious econometric 
studies, in addition to the lack of present cases, means that anticompetitive 
behaviour will remain a low risk-of-detection and high rate of return proposition. 
Third, any serious work by banks to prevent and detect anticompetitive behaviour is 
made high-cost and low return as a result of the lack of work by the Government to 
provide toolkits, relevant information, and public data that competitors can use to 
sniff out perpetrators. Indeed, the lack of guidance and opinions by the Commission 
makes suggesting compliance standards or procedures, or undertaking any internal 
antitrust audit a risky task.85 
 
Detecting Anticompetitive Behaviour and Creating Antitrust Compliance 
Campaigns in Malaysia’s Financial Services 
 
Econometric methods of detecting anticompetitive lending behaviour (as only one 
example of a range of areas of potential anticompetitive behaviour) in Malaysia’s 
financial services sector should concern bank managers for three reasons. First, 
econometric methods can help pin-point collusion by mid-level managers or even 
the CEO without the knowledge of the banks’ Board. Early detection using statistics 
can help prevent later complaints by consumers and rival banks.86 Second, such 
data can help spot anticompetitive behaviour among rivals.87As Malaysia is likely 
                                                 
84 Using the words of the Act itself, “the Minister shall prescribe the mechanism to determine that 
profit is unreasonably high.” Id at 15(1).  
85 See Rastan  Loong and Cara Kararuddin, Challenges Lie Ahead for Malaysia’s New Competition 
Commission, INT’L FIN. L. REV., 2012, available online. 
86 In the broader compliance and law enforcement literature, the question about statistical versus 
intelligence-based detection methods remains an open one.   
87 An interesting aside concerns whether the collection of such data can promote collusion rather 
than serve to discover the collusive behaviour of industry rivals. One-sided knowledge of rivals’ 
pricing and production strategies can allow firms like banks to tacitly collude by setting prices and 
 29
to follow the UK civil justice system’s precedent, it will allow private rights of 
action by which bank managers can recoup losses arising from such rivals’ 
anticompetitive behaviour through compensatory damages only (rather than to the 
extent possible with treble damages under the US system).88 Authors like Carletti et 
al., using data, identify unfair or discriminatory access conditions, partial data 
sharing, and regulatory barriers as problems in the EU context.89 They also identify 
increasingly high switching costs as a factor providing banks with significant 
market power. Malaysian banks might benefit from Carletti-like studies. Third, 
bank managers can use such data to argue for or against particular competition 
policies. In Italy for example, bank managers used comparative data about the cost 
of opening an account as a way to argue for pro-competitive policies.90 
 
What are some of the data that bank managers and compliance officers could use to 
their bank’s benefit? Figure 21 provides examples of some of the data that could be 
obtained – and ideas on ways in which this data might be used. Data about lending, 
revenue earning from such lending – and patterns across time and across banks -- 
can provide bank managers and auditors with information they need to detect 
anticompetitive behaviour in their own institution, spot anticompetitive behaviour 
by rivals, and militate for competition policy change.  
 
Figure 21: Publicly Available Variables and Use in Spotting Anti-Competitive 
Behaviour 
 
Variable Use 
Value of loans  Use in identifying whether lending decreases or increases strategically across 
banks 
Net interest 
revenue 
Use to compare with value of loans (as we do below) across banks to see if 
any serial correlation 
Interest income on 
loans 
Useful when comparing with the value of loans, looking at changes over 
time, and correlating with factors that may signal collusion or abuse of 
market power.  
Residential 
Mortgage Loans 
This data can be used to comparebetween banks and monitor volumes of 
these loans relative to others (like consumer, retail, and 
corporate/commercial loans) to detect sub-sector specific anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
Number of 
investigations 
Useful as dependent variable to figure out what lending and interest earning 
behaviour has correlated with anticompetitive behaviour in the past. 
                                                                                                                                        
quantities which maximise profits. See Anthony Dennis, Assessing The Risks of Competitive 
Intelligence Activities Under The Antitrust Laws, 46 S.C. L. REV. 263, 1995.  
88 Unfortunately Malaysian courts will probably not award large damages to antitrust litigants in the 
near future. By awarding very large awards, Malaysian courts can help provide incentives for firms 
to police markets far more effectively than the cash-strapped Competition Commission ever could.   
89See Elena Carletti, Giancarlo Spagnolo, ,StefanoCaiazza, and CaterinaGiannetti, Banking 
Competition in Europe: Antitrust Authorities at Work in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, 33 WORLD 
COMP L & ECON. REV. 4, 2010, available online.  
90 In the current Malaysian policymaking environment, the Competition Commission and 
Government will not undertake their own studies to assess the extent to which competition-related 
policies help or hurt business. Banks’ own research can help fill this gap. For an example of such a 
study (from a research institution), see Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales, The Cost of 
Banking Regulation, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 12501, 2006.  
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Net loans The difference between gross and net lending may signal anticompetitive 
behaviour (as lenders may write loans they intend to cancel or have quick 
repayment in order to puff up the supposed value of lending).  
Repo volume  Banks may use data about repo levels to particular banks as a signal of 
current or future lending.  
Share 
government/family 
ownership 
Useful in determining statistically if a particular ownership pattern correlates 
with lending and/or profit trends, suggesting collusion-inducing 
communication  
Source: variables provided by Bankscope with explanations provided by authors.  
 
Suspicious patterns in data can provide insight about both legal and illegal methods 
of competing in Malaysia’s banking sector. Figure 22 shows, one example of an 
interesting trend in the data that may further investigation by bank managers and 
internal auditors to establish the existence of anticompetitive activities. The figure 
shows the relationship between the amount of interest banks earn and the profit 
margin on that interest. Interestingly, the more the largest Malaysian banks earn, the 
higher their profit margins. Size in lending represents an important predictor of 
lending profitability in Malaysia. Of these banks, CIMB Group Holding 
represents the one to watch – with loan yields at least 100 basis points above the 
others. Such data does not imply definite anticompetitive behaviour. They just tell 
auditors and others that this is an anomaly that is worthy of further investigation.91 
 
                                                 
91 Of such lending, commercial lending (commercial loans) represents both the highest risk of 
anticompetitive capital allocation and the largest part of Malaysian banks’ lending portfolios. On 
average, they made up 36% of all loan types – compared with 24% for residential mortgages and 
28% for consumer loans. 
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Figure 22: Suspiciously, Larger Lending Portfolios Mean MORE Profits 
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The data in the figure show the relationship between interest income amounts and net interest 
margins. The relatively strong positive relationship suggests size matters in lending in Malaysia. The 
bottom panel shows interest income as a percent of the total value of loans for the banks indicated.  
Source: WRDS (2014).  
 
Looking at company data can reveal as many insightful patterns as looking at 
banks’ data. Figure 23 shows interest-to-revenue ratios (expressed in basis points) 
for Malaysian companies in 2012.92 Malaysian company borrowing in any 
particular sector will depend on that company’s growth prospects, previous 
revenues, interest rates and a host of other factors. However, companies’ interest 
payments which fall significantly outside those of its peers can suggest who might 
be a victim or beneficiary of anticompetitive bank behaviour. Excessively high 
interest payments may mean that the company has too easy access to bank loans (if 
the company wants to gorge itself on cheap capital). Or such high interest payments 
may mean the company has too restricted access to capital (as its borrowing terms 
are more onerous than its peers). The same considerations apply when interest 
payments – as a percentage of the company’s revenues – are too low. The actual 
level of these interest payments tells us far less than how they compare to peers. In 
the figure, we see that the industrial company grouping tends to have some 
companies with exceedingly high interest payments.  
 
                                                 
92 We express these ratios in basis point terms so we do not have data which looks like 0.002, 0.102 
and so forth. One hundred basis points equals 1% -- meaning that the “10” on the vertical axis 
represents an income-payment-to-company-revenue ratio of 0.1%.  
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Figure 23: Spread in Companies' Interest to Revenue Ratios Tells Something About 
Profitability Which Is Too High or Too Low
The f igure show s interest to revenue ratios for roughly 820 Malaysian companies. As borrow ers, interest payments too 
high or too low  relative to the company's revenues could signal too free or too stringent access to lending. 
Source: WRDS (2014).
number of 
companies
w ith more than 100 
basis points
in interest-to-
revenue
Energy Industrials Consumer Financials Telecoms
 
 
What do these differences imply about internal audit strategy? A wide range of 
“toolkits” can help bank managers and internal auditors prevent, detect and repress 
anticompetitive behaviour.93Figure 24 describes some of the ways internal auditors 
can react when their bank sits at one of the extremes we have described.94Auditors 
need to define risks of anticompetitive behaviour in the bank and assess the extent 
to which various actions can help reduce the risk of government or competitor 
action costing the bank money.95 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 For one such toolkit, see ICC, THE ICC ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE TOOLKIT, 2013, available online. 
94 Most of the law firm advice self-servingly assumes that more-compliance-is-better, ignoring the 
fact that antitrust compliance programmes should focus on specifically, empirically identified risks. 
SeeKiran Desai, Antitrust compliance programmes, MAYER, BROWN, ROWE& MAW CLIENT 
BRIEFING, available online. 
95 For an example of the way probability assessments can be used in deciding on firm or court 
mandated antitrust-related remedies, seeYavarBathaee, Developing an Antitrust Injury Requirement 
for Injunctive Relief that Reflects the Probability of Anticompetitive Harm,13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 329, 2008.  
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Figure 24: Being Too Similar or Different Doesn’t Mean Anti-Competitive Behaviour, 
But Should be Explainable 
 
We have described several ways of statistically detecting when a financial firm may have 
access to relationships or size advantages which give it market power. Not all market power 
is illegal. However, market power (or obvious lack of such power) raises red flags which 
may attract regulators’ attention. What should Malaysian bank managers do when they fall 
into the “too similar or too different” camp for market-related reasons which they can not 
obviously explain? 
 
1. conduct a risk-based antitrust audit – differences may actually stem from 
anticompetitive behaviour of the bank’s agents (employees and managers). Antitrust risk is 
defined as the probability of illegal behaviour multiplied by the value of the potential gain 
(or harm to consumers). Internal audit staff can help define this risk more clearly.  
 
2. review bundled services – tying in financial services has become an areas of intense 
recent academic and policymaker interest. Bank managers can ask whether selling certain 
types of services together gives the bank a perceived unfair advantage.  
 
3. start an internal investigation – investigations can range in formality, from curious 
questions to formal questioning in the presence of the employee’s legal counsel. Such 
investigations provide far more information than statistical analysis. They may also 
seriously damage the internal auditor’s attempts to foster a constructive antitrust 
environment.  
 
4. start/strengthen a whistleblowing programme – perhaps one the cheapest and most 
effective measures a bank can take. Such work can encourage employees (agents) to speak 
up with financial rewards or other incentives.  
 
5. review blog chatter for complaints – aggrieved customers can complain on their social 
media accounts about anticompetitive behaviour. Competitive intelligence software can 
help alert bank managers and internal auditors to issues before they come to the attention of 
regulators and competitors.  
Several other actions (as briefly mentioned in the figure) can also help address the 
potential red flags for anticompetitive behaviour raised by statistical analysis. 
Malaysian bank managers can review their bundled services (like offering loans and 
selling loan insurance at the same time).96 Internal investigations (both exploratory 
and specifically focused on suspected illegal anticompetitive behaviour) can also 
help detect and stop such behaviour before the Competition Commission and/or 
                                                 
96 The line between legal “bundling” and illegal “tying” remains fuzzy, for banks as well as those 
who regulate them. For a brief discussion of the issues from North America, see Carolyn Naiman 
and Jason Brooks, Are Canadian Banks Fit to Be Tied?CAN. COMP. REC. 2004. See also, US Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Today’s Credit Markets, Relationship Banking, and Tying, 2003, 
available online. 
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competitors can take action.97 Monitoring regular and social media also provides 
Malaysian bank managers with advanced warning from the public about 
dissatisfaction with aspects of the banks’ behaviour that may later attract antitrust 
attention.98 
 
Whistleblowing programmes within Malaysian banks represent one of the most 
potentially important initiatives banks’ management can take to detect and stop 
anticompetitive behaviour.99 Under whistleblower programmes, Malaysian bank 
employees and managers could complain internally about anticompetitive 
behaviour by the bank. Both the economics and legal literature supports antitrust 
whistleblower programmes. In the economics literature, whistleblower programmes 
have been shown to reduce the probability of collusion, decrease rents, and even 
decrease the expected fines for firms found guilty of collusion.100 Whistleblowing 
programmes which reward whistleblowers with cash, prestige, job advancement and 
other perks provide “negative fines” – strongly increasing the probability of 
detection of, and punishment for, anticompetitive behaviour.101 In the law literature, 
the recent passage of the US Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2013 shows 
that the US legal and political community favours the protection of persons who 
blow the whistle on anticompetitive behaviour within their firms.102 
 
Malaysian law provides the legislative framework for the operation of antitrust 
whistleblower programmes in Malaysian banks. The Competition Act provides 
protection for whistleblowers – only in the specific case of making a complaint to 
the Competition Commission or helping with the making of such a complaint.103 
Specifically, the Act prohibits coercing (or attempting to coerce) persons from 
reporting to the Competition Commission or assisting with Competition 
Commission investigations.104 Such protections only apply in case the 
whistleblower goes to the Competition Commission. Moreover, the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 2010 provides for the whistleblower’s identity to remain 
confidential to the public, his or her immunity from civil and criminal action, and 
                                                 
97 For a US perspective and how-to manual on such internal investigations, see ABA, ANTITRUST 
COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS, 2005.  
98 For a review of competition cases appearing in the Malaysian popular press, see Cassey Lee, 
Competition Law Enforcement in Malaysia: Some Recent Developments, ERIA-DP-2014-02, 2014, 
available online. For a recent example concerning financial services, seeAzli Jamil, Agents cry foul 
over EMGS-AXA link-up, FMT NEWS, March 27, 2013, available online. 
99 Potentially because not everyone thinks whistleblowing will work – particularly in Malaysia. See 
David Lehmann, Whistleblowing won't work in Malaysia, DELOITTE MYINSIGHT, available online. 
100 See Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go 
to Prison? In Johan Stennek (ed.) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST, 2007. 
101  See Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq and Giancarlo Spagnolo, Fines, 
Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment, CEPR DP7417, 2009.  
102 See Layne Kruse, Carlos Rainer, and Aubrey Stock, Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 
2013, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT BRIEFING, 2013, available online.  
103 Competition Act s. 34.  
104 Id at 34(1) for the substantive provisions of the protection and 34(3) for the definition of types of 
whistleblowing and collaboration with the Commission. Article 34(2) – for its part – provides a non-
exhaustive list of the types of coercion prohibited under the Act.    
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protection against retaliation by law enforcement agencies.105As discussed in Figure 
25, other legislation allows whistleblowers to approach government agencies. 
However, Malaysian law provides few incentives for whistleblowers – like internal 
auditors – to approach management directly with their concerns.106 
 
Figure 25: How Poor Whistleblower Protection Law in Malaysia Discourages Internal 
Auditors from Informing Managers About Anticompetitive Behaviour During Audit 
Engagements 
 
Suppose an audit team have discovered a weakness in the Malaysian bank client which 
tolerates or promotes anticompetitive behaviour. The audit team makes recommendations 
to address the issues discovered, and thereby decrease the risk of investigation by the 
Competition Commission. Subsequently, the team is, made aware that higher management 
wishes the matter to be dropped and that no mention of the discovered behaviour should be 
included in the internal audit report. What are the legal consequences?  
 
Unfortunately, Malaysian law gives little effective protection to whistleblowers using 
internal channels. The Whistleblower Protection Act provides protection for auditors who 
inform the police.107 The Companies Act and Capital Services Act allow potential 
whistleblowers to inform the Companies Registrar. If the company (bank) has acceded to 
the Bursa Malaysia’s Corporate Governance Guide, the company may have included 
whistleblowing policies into company code of conduct or employment handbook. 
Dismissing an internal auditor (or other employee) for whistleblowing may then amount to 
breach of contract. Moreover, under the Industrial Relations Act, termination of 
employment as a retaliatory measure for whistleblowing may represent a breach of 
employment (due to the provisions of the Act itself).  
 
In any case, few remedies exist for whistleblowers intending to approach employers with 
concerns about anticompetitive behaviour. Internal auditors and other employees looking to 
protect themselves will need to convince a Malaysian court that some breach of contract 
has occurred – a difficult and uncertain task at best.  
 
Source: based on Tan and Ong (2011).  
 
What effect would antitrust whistleblower programmes have in Malaysia’s banks if 
local laws provided adequate incentives? We cannot know for sure – as the research 
only provides subjective evidence about the likely effect on such managers and 
internal auditors. Figure 26 shows the results of several studies of Malaysian 
                                                 
105 Whistleblower Protection Act 2010, Act 711, s. 7(1), available online.  
106 To complicate matters further, if the whistleblower is an internal auditor, he has a professional 
duty to report and leave the concern with the company’s management under Standard 2060 and 
Practice Advisory 2060-1. Practice Advisory 2440-2 (Communicating Sensitive Information Within 
and Outside the Chain of Command) basically encourages internal auditors to do the right thing – 
keeping sensitive communications within the organisation, unless “legal or regulatory imperative, or 
a professional or ethical obligation, requires further action.” See Institute of Internal Auditors, 
Practice Advisory 2440-2: Communicating Sensitive Information Within and Outside the Chain of 
Command.  
107See Pei-Men Tan and Seng-FookOng, Adequacy of Employee Whistleblower Protection in 
Malaysia, 5 INT’L PROCEED. OF ECO. DEV. & RES. 2; 2011, available online.  
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managers and internal auditors about their “whistleblowing intention.” This variable 
combines answers to several survey questions about how strongly respondents feel 
about the desirability and applicability of whistleblowing to their own work 
experience. The seriousness of the infraction and the length of the respondents’ 
work experience in the company affect inclinations to complain about improper or 
illegal behaviour.108 Work experience and particularly ethics training predicted 
positive propensities to blow the whistle on illegal conduct as well.109 
 
Figure 26: Ethics Training Seems to Affect the Receptivity of Malaysian 
Managers and Internal Auditors to Whistleblowing 
 
Variable Important? Yes No 
Job Function   
Organisation Size   
Gender   
Seriousness of infraction   
Status of wrongdoer   
Age   
Work experience   
Ethics training   
Black shaded boxes indicate a statistically significant correlation at the 5% level. A “no” shading 
indicates the lack of such a statistically significant finding.  
Sources: Ab-Ghaniet al.(2011), Ahmad et al. (2010).  
 
What specifically are Malaysian managers’ propensities and expected results of 
whistleblowing, should their banks establish internal whistleblowing policies? 
Figure 27 provides data on attitudes toward whistleblowing specifically in 
Malaysian banks.110 A low integer on the authors’ scale indicates an unfavourable 
attitude or outcome, whereas a higher score represents a favourable or positive 
outcome. Thus, attitudes measuring a 3.12 (on average) to report wrongdoing (be it 
anticompetitive behaviour or other malfeasance) to the appropriate bank staff 
signals rather neutral feelings about whistleblowing. On average, Malaysian bank 
employees evince unequivocal propensities to report to wrong doing to upper level 
management. The respondents felt most strongly that “reporting wrongdoing helps 
prevent serious harm to the bank” (with a score of 4.01 out of 5). However, these 
staff would be unlikely to “tell a supervisor” scoring only 3.1 on this 5 point scale.  
                                                 
108 See Syahrul Ahmad, Malcolm Smith, and Zubaidah Ismail, Internal Whistleblowing Intentions in 
Malaysia: Factors that Influence Internal Auditors’ Decision-Making Process, ASBES 2011-051-
155, available online. 
109 Nadzri Ab-Ghani, Jeremy Galbreath and Robert Evans, Predicting Whistle-Blowing Intention 
Among Supervisors In Malaysia, 3 J. OF GLOBAL MAN. 1, 2011, available online.  
110 See C.H. Ponnu, K. Naidu and W. Zamri, Determinants of Whistle Blowing, 4 INT’L REV. OF BUS. 
RES. PAP. 1, 2008, available online. The 144 respondents in the survey came from Affin Bank (28%), 
Alliance Bank  (6%), Public Bank (10%), Hong Leong Bank (4%), Southern Bank (11%), Maybank 
(4%), Am Bank (35%)and EON Bank (2%).  
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Figure 27: Ambivalent Attitudes toward Whistleblowing 
in Malaysia’s Banking Sector 
 
 “bad”  “good” 
Internal Reporting 1 2 3 4 5 
I would report wrongdoing to appropriate person in bank   3.12   
I would use reporting channels inside bank   3.15   
I would let upper level management know about it   3   
I would tell supervisor   3.1   
External Reporting      
I would report it to appropriate authorities outside organisation  2.6    
I would use reporting channels outside bank  2.47    
I would provide info. to outside agencies  2.11    
I would inform public  2.1    
Reasons for Whistleblowing      
Reporting wrongdoing helps prevent serious harm to bank    4.01  
Whistleblowing enhances the public interest   3.31   
Reporting way to do duty   3.81   
Whistleblowing is moral   3.1   
Results of Whistleblowing      
Bank would hinder/ignore my reporting  2.74    
Difficulties too great to endure   3.17   
Reporting won’t make a difference  2.73    
They will retaliate against me   3.01   
Source: paraphrased from Ponnu et al.(2008).  
We have labelled low scores as “bad” – as they generally reflect attitudes not conducive toward 
whistleblowing, like disagreeing with the statement in the figure. The “good” scores (toward 5 points) 
tend to reflect attitudes conducive to whistleblowing – like agreeing with the statements in the figure.  
 
The likely success of whistle blowing measures will depend on economic and other 
incentives. Specifically, they will depend on the extent to which Malaysian banking 
sector antitrust compliance programmes are incentive compatible. The economic 
literature provides some analysis looking at the incentives to adopt and comply with 
internal antitrust rules.111Well-defined and clear antitrust regulations and controls 
signal strong interest in complying with legislation like the Competition Act. 
Unavailable or poorly defined rules and controls signal that management does not 
actively seek to follow the law. Petronas provides a positive example – defining 
clear antitrust rules because of the large losses the company could face in a range of 
jurisdictions for violating them. Petronas’ antitrust guidelines are contained in the 
company’s Code of Conduct and specific guidance is provided in the PETRONAS 
Competition Guidelines.112As described in Figure 28, the quality of antitrust rules 
may, in themselves, provide a red flag for internal auditors and regulators 
examining the probability of company engagement in anticompetitive behaviour. 
When companies (like Petronas) have large revenues, likely low rents from 
                                                 
111 For an excellent overview, see Rosa Abrantes-Metz and Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Corporate 
Governance and Compliance, U. OF MINN.. L.S. RES. PAP. 13-18, 2013, available online.  
112 See PETRONAS Code of Conduct and Business Ethics (CoBE), available online. See also 
PETRONAS Competition Guidelines, available online.  
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collusion, and large potential losses from a competition authority’s investigation, 
the company will have strong incentives to define good antitrust controls. However, 
companies operating in protected, domestic markets which generate rents, and 
which (for political or other reasons) will likely face little competition agency 
oversight, internal antitrust controls will remain poor, as the incentives to comply 
simply do not exist. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Poorly Designed Antitrust Controls Can Suggest  
Anticompetitive Behaviour (Or At Least Indifference) 
 
Why would a bank establish a whistleblower protection scheme than make it unusable? 
Why would complaints fail to be investigated internally? Why not ask employees about 
their perceptions and experiences with collusion and market abuse? Instead of finding 
anticompetitive behaviour, and then working backwards to see which controls failed, 
internal auditors can work the other way around. They can look for absent or badly 
designed policies, and use those to point to areas of potential anticompetitive behaviour. 
The following shows, in “topic cloud” format, the main red flags which suggest 
anticompetitive behaviour – or managerial apathy/negligence toward antitrust issues.  
 
1. Antitrust audit. No assessment of antitrust risk during annual audit planning exercise 
with chief audit officer. No conduct of risk self-assessment to identify risks. No analysis of 
market data.  
 
2. Hotline. No hotline exists to collect complaints about anticompetitive behaviour. Person 
taking the calls doesn’t have script about what to do in case of complaint.  
 
3. Internal counsel. No procedures for dealing with inquiries by Competition Commission. 
No training about what to do in case of accusation of anticompetitive behaviour.  
 
4. Whistle-blower protection programme. No whistleblower protection programme in 
place. No procedures to collect complaints within the organisation.  
 
5. Media monitoring. No monitoring of traditional social media for accusations or hints 
about anticompetitive behaviour by staff or rivals. Managers never met to discuss how to 
deal with complaints (no matter how unreliable).  
 
6. Internal investigation.  Compliance staff, legal counsel and managers have never 
questioned anyone on staff about suspected anticompetitive behaviour (or even possible 
risk/weak points for such behaviour).   
 
7. Feedback on policy. Never gave feedback on policies directly to Commission or 
through Malaysian Bankers Association.  
 
As we will see in the next section, poor incentives do not just affect whistleblowing; 
they affect all parts of antitrust compliance.  
 
 
 
 39
The Effect on the Competition Act on Anticompetitive Behaviour in Malaysian 
Banking 
 
How much would Malaysian banks, financial services providers and companies pay 
to avoid investigation by the Competition Commission? Figure 29 shows the 
amount of antitrust fines paid annually in the US and EU since 2008.113 US fines 
generally hover between $500 million and $1 billion per year – the amount of 
money some of the larger Malaysian banks earned in net interest margins over the 
period. However, EU fines have varied wildly over the period. In 2010, antitrust 
fines topped $3.7 billion, descending the next year by about $3 billion. If the 
Malaysian Competition Commission imposed EU-level fines and punishments, such 
punishments would strongly encourage Malaysian banks (and other companies) to 
adopt stringent internal antitrust controls. At US level fines, large Malaysian banks 
would see a significant or complete evaporation of profits. At EU levels, antitrust 
fines would impose a de facto death sentence on anticompetitive behaviour (and the 
organisations engaging in such behaviour).114 
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Figure 29: Antitrust Fines in Other Jurisdictions Would Wipe
Out Malaysian Banks' Net Interest Margins
The f igure show s antitrust f ines and other monetary assessments paid in/to the US and the EU (in US dollars). In 
contrast, w e show  net interest margins for tw o of Malaysia's larger banks (expressed in US dollars). 
Source: Brass et al.  (2013) for f ines and WRDS (2014) for net interest margins. 
 
 
Antitrust investigations and prosecutions can have other effects on a firm’s ability 
to reward anticompetitive behaviour – such as affecting the firm’s share price. 
Shareholders may sell their shares on news of the opening of an antitrust 
investigation as such investigations are costly in terms of management time, legal 
fees, and may result in fines so reducing  illegal anticompetitive rents which have 
contributed to the company’s profits. As such, even the threat of an antitrust 
investigation may help deter illegal anticompetitive behaviour – particularly if the 
cost of such enforcement action exceeds the profits earned from illegal 
anticompetitive behaviour. Figure 29 shows the effect of announced antitrust 
                                                 
113 See Rachel Brass, David Burns, Nathan, Michael McGinnis, Trey Nicoud, Peter Squeri, Quynh 
Vu, and David Wood, 2012 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, 2013, 
available online. 
114 Fabra and Motta find that, even with bankruptcy-inducing fines, companies may still have 
economic incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour. Their solution consists of imposing 
fines based on general economic growth. From the figure in the main text, we see EU competition 
authorities failed to heed their advice. See Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta, Antitrust Fines in 
Times of Crisis, CEPR DP9290, 2013.  
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enforcement in the EU on target companies’ share prices.115 If Malaysia follows 
other countries, an investigation can reduce Malaysian banks’ value by up to 5%. In 
general, whether well-founded or unfounded, such investigations can reduce a 
company’s valuation over time – on average by about 1% to 2%. Data from 
Malaysia shows that such effects hold as much in Malaysia as in the EU.116 
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Source: Langus and Motta (2007).
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Figure 30: Antitrust Investigations Usually Correspond with Falling Share Prices
 
 
The Competition Act – and accompanying Guidelines on Financial Penalties – 
outlines the approach of the Competition Commission to the imposition of penalties 
and remedies anticompetitive behaviour. Figure 31 provides a summary review of 
these remedies – and their likely effect on banks. The Competition Commission has 
five tools at its disposal. The Commission can require banks to stop their 
anticompetitive activity.117 Such orders leave previous gains intact, and such a 
‘remedy’ may simply encourage banks to better conceal their unlawful activity in 
the future. Similarly, the Commission may require banks to undertake particular 
actions (or avoid others) in order to eliminate their anticompetitive behaviour.118 
The Commission may impose fines, maxing out at 10 million ringgit, for activities 
which help anticompetitive behaviour illegally try to avoid detection or 
                                                 
115 See Gregor Langus, Massimo Motta, and Luca Aguzzoni. The Impact of EU antitrust 
investigations and fines on a firm’s valuation. CEPR DP 6176, available online. 
116 We do not have good data allowing us to analyse the way antitrust investigations in Malaysia 
affect Malaysian company share prices. However, studies exist about the way that investigations for 
other types of economic crimes affect Malaysian equity prices. For an example (showing that 
criminal investigations lead to declining share prices in the Malaysian context), see Chin-Hong Puah 
and Wei-Siew Liew, White-collar crime and stock return: Empirical study from announcement effect, 
MPRA Paper 31748, 2011, available online.   
117 The Commission can “require that the infringement to be ceased immediately...[and] may specify 
steps which are required to be taken by the infringing enterprise, which appear to the Commission to 
be appropriate for bringing the infringement to an end.” Competition Act at 40.1(a)-(b). We have 
removed lettered list format in the original for ease of reading.  
118 The Commission “may give any other direction as it deems appropriate.” In this context, such 
“direction” probably includes requirements to end contracts, instructions about setting prices (fees), 
requirements to provide financial services to particular organisations, and so forth. Id. at 40.1(d).  
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prosecution.119 We show later in this section such fines will probably fail to deter 
anticompetitive behaviour. The Commission may put bankers in prison.120 In theory, 
the Act may allow the Commission to impose US-style monitorships and require 
the company to engage in costly compliance activity which basically services a 
punitive purpose.121 Most importantly, the Commission may impose penalties of up 
to 10% of the company’s world-wide revenue “[during] the period [in] which an 
[antitrust] infringement occurred.”122 
 
Figure 31: Potential Remedies for Anticompetitive Behaviour By Malaysia’s 
Financial Service Providers 
 
Remedy Likely effect on banks  Citation 
Cease and desist 
orders  
Keeps their anticompetitive rents intact – so unlikely to 
have any effect.  
40(1)(a) 
Positive or negative 
injunctions to 
restrain or require 
future conduct 
Likely to encourage banks to hide anticompetitive 
behaviour better rather than discourage such behaviour.  
40(1)(b) 
Fines for obstruction 
of justice-type 
“offences” 
Can demotivate and remove previous profits from 
anticompetitive behaviour up to RM10 million, with 
likely result of increasing anticompetitive behaviour. 
These consist of penalties for “offences” which we 
describe in the main text.  
61(a)-(b) and 
65(3) 
Imprisonment No imprisonment for substantive anti-competitive acts, 
only for obstruction of investigations or destruction of 
evidence or Little (as most jurisdictions do not use jail 
as a serious deterrent or punishment). 
23,24,25,32,33, 
34 & 61,62 
“Penalties” of up to 
10% of world-wide 
turnover for the 
period of the 
infringement 
Slightly reduces profits. These consist of the 
“infractions” of the Act which we describe in the main 
text.  
40.1(4) 
Self-monitoring and 
poison pills 
Will increase compliance costs, possibly encouraging 
anticompetitive behaviour.  
40.1(d) 
Source: Competition Act (2012), with interpretation by authors. We do not analyse the effects of 
Commission orders (like injunctive or mandamus orders) to focus on the effects of financial 
penalties.  
                                                 
119 We describe these fines in more detail later in this section. The Act allows for fines applied to 
individuals as well as companies. We focus on fines to the company and not the relatively 
inconsequential fines of 2 million ringgit (or about $617,000) for individuals convicted under the 
Act.  
120 The Act allows for (besides fines), “imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.” Id at 
61(b).  
121 To many, the wide ranging regulations imposed on banks after 2008 represent an attempt to 
punish as much as regulate. Less controversially, a competition authority may engage in agreements 
which require extensive monitoring or even temporary custodianship of the corporate perpetrator. In 
the US, authorities have recently used non-prosecution agreements and monitorships to enforce 
antitrust law. Such agreements require that offending companies engage an independent monitor to 
oversee company activity. See Joel Levin, A Rare Sight: DOJ Antitrust Division Uses Non-
Prosecution Agreement To Resolve Bid Rigging Allegations Against UBS, PERKINS COIE BRIEF, 
2011, available online. 
122 Competition Act at s.40(1)(4).  
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Internal auditors need to look at (and keep clear in their minds) both risks of 
“infringement” and the commission of “offences.” An ‘infringement’ under the Act 
consists of the abuse of market power or collusion. An ‘offence’ however, consists 
of activities aimed at concealing the infringement or other “obstruction of justice” 
type activities we describe in the paper. Importantly, ‘offences’ are punished 
through criminal penalties, whereas ‘infringements’ are punished through civil 
(revenue-based) penalties. 
 
Fines for ‘obstruction of justice’ style offences will not discourage “supporting 
behaviours” to anticompetitive behaviour (to the extent it occurs) in Malaysia’s 
banking sector.123 At present, 10 million ringgit seems the maximum penalty 
Malaysian banks might face for offences committed under the Competition Act.124 
Separately, the Financial Services Act provides that “any person who [engages in 
anticompetitive behaviour] commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding ten 
million ringgit or to both.”125 As for the Competition Act (and we still talk here 
about “offences”, not “infringements” punishable by revenue penalties),the Act sets 
fines of 5 million ringgits for companies for their first offence, and 10 million for 
their second offence.126 For individuals (natural persons), the Act provides for a 
fine of 1 million ringgit for the first offence and 2 million for the second and 
subsequent offences (in addition to jail time).127 If the Competition Commission 
sets penalties for other offence-type behaviour, they can impose “a fine not 
exceeding one million ringgit, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding fiv
128
e years 
r to both.”  
y 
es 
                                                
o
 
Such maximum fines provide exceedingly scant deterrence to Malaysia’s banks 
seeking to conceal anticompetitive behaviour. Figure 32 shows income earned b
Malaysia’s banks in 2012, and compares such income with the maximum fin
allowable under the Financial Services or Competition Acts for committing 
“offences” (again, this does not account for “infringements” that are penalised 
 
123 We address “supporting behaviours” to anticompetitive behaviour because the Competition Act 
makes a distinction between financial penalties for “infringements” (which are the actual 
anticompetitive behaviour itself) and “offences” (which are behaviours that generally illegally hinder 
the Competition Commission. Some of these offences include failure to produce records at the 
Commission’s request (art. 20), disclosure or use of confidential information (art. 21), giving false or 
misleading information (art. 23), destroying or mutilating records (art. 24), breaking a seal on 
evidence (art. 25.7), obstructs Commission access to premises (art. 32), tips of perpetrators (art. 33), 
threaten or actually seek revenge for whistleblowing (art. 34), or acts which future regulations define 
as an offence (art. 65.3).   
124 We discuss revenue-based penalties for ‘infringements’ later in this section. We discuss fines, as 
they feature prominently in recent Malaysian antitrust cases – particularly the Malaysian Airlines/Air 
Asia case. See Star, MAS-AirAsia infringed Competition Act, fined RM10mil each, Star Online, 
available online. 
125 Financial Services Act at 124(4).   
126 Competition Act at art. 61(a) 
127 Competition Act at art. 61(b). 
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according to 10% of worldwide revenue). For Malaysia’s largest earning bank
10 million ringgit maximum fine for an offence under either act represents a 
miniscule proportion of their annual income. For Malaysia’s lowest-earning ban
the fine represents less than half of a year’s income.
s, the 
ks, 
nes for offences-- not the infractions which constitute anticompetitive behaviour. 
 
129 We only talk now about 
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Figure 32: For Large Earners, Commission Fines are Laughable...
The figure show s income earned by the highest-earning Malaysian banks in 2012 from interest, proprietary trading, 
and fees/commissions. The red line show s the maximum fine imposible by the Bank Negara and/or the Competition 
Commission. To the naked eye, the red line is indistinguishable from zero. 
Source: WRDS (2014). 
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Figure 32 (continued) ... and Even for Lowest Earners, Commission Fines Are Minor
The figure show s income earned by the low est-earning Malaysian banks in 2012 from interest, proprietary trading, 
and fees/commissions. The red line show s the maximum fine imposible by the Bank Negara and/or the Competition 
Commission. Even the low est earning banks have no problem paying such a fine.  
Source: WRDS (2014).  
 
Worse still, fixed maximum fines may actually encourage banks to attempt to hide
their anticompetitive behaviour.
 
                                                
130 Figure 33 shows why the imposition of a low, 
maximum fine (relative to income and thus likely collusive rents) encourages all 
groups of Malaysian banks to increase illegal efforts to avoiding the detection of 
their anticompetitive behaviour. The figure describes the logic main for applying 
fines for “offences” -- not for revenue-based “infractions.” In relation to the group 
of banks which do not engage in anticompetitive behaviour, they earn no rents (and 
 
129 Markham makes the other valid point that such fines punish banks’ shareholders and investors 
rather than the managers actually engaging in anticompetitive behaviour, further reducing the 
disincentives to prevent anticompetitive activity. See Jesse Markham, The Failure of Corporate 
Governance Standards and Antitrust Compliance, 58 S. DAK. L. REV. 3, 2013.  
130 Many other academics have discovered this fact before. Jensen et al. specifically quantify the 
exact conditions under which fines like the Competition Commission’s will lead banks to conceal 
their anticompetitive behaviour rather than reduce it. See Sissel Jensen, Ola Kvaloy, Trond Olsen 
and Lars Sorgard, Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher 
overcharge, NORWEGIAN SCH. OF ECON. WP 4, 2013, available online. 
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we label the amount of rents earned by this group as A). Because they now must pay
compliance costs, they have incentives to increase their anticompetitive behaviour 
(given the likely low probability of detection) to cover these new costs.
 
ct 
figure, 
se banks, after paying the 
ne, they still profit from anticompetitive behaviour.132 
 
131 The new 
level of rents they earn rises to A’. At the best, they just ignore the Competition A
(such that A=A’). Groups of banks that flagrantly collude and abuse their market 
power (earning more than RM10 million in rents) should just continue. In the 
we show this group as earning D in rents. We assume that their rents after the 
highly imperfect enforcement of the Competition Act remain at D’ (such that 
D=D’). Even if the Competition Commission catches the
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Figure 33: Only a very small group of banks have incentives to 
obey the Competition Act
A
A’ B
B’
C
C’
D D’ A A
firms that dont collude
still pay compliance costs, so without subsidies
they will have incentive to collude to recoup
losses
B B firms that profit little from collusion
they can pay fines well in excess of the gain
they receive from colluding. So they should
increase rents to “make it worth their while”
C C firms that profit alot from collusion
10m ringgits is the max they pay. So
they should ramp up rents, so they don’t 
end up paying more than they earn
firms  earning more than 10m ringgit
they should just pay the fines and keep
engaging in anticompetitive behaviour
D D
non
colluders
little
colluders
larger
colluders
massive
colluders
rents they 
earn now
rents they need 
after enforcement
of Competition Act
level of 
rents
The figure shows the effect of imposing the Competition Act’s maximum fines on various groups of banks engaging in 
various levels of anticompetitive behaviour (and thus earning different levels of rents). In all cases, the 
best level of anticompetitive behaviour is higher after enforcing the Malaysian Competition Act. 
 
 
The interesting cases concern Malaysian banks which earn less than R
Banks earning far less – like RM2 million in rents – should bump up 
anticompetitive behaviour just a bit.
M10 million. 
in 
e 
                                                
133 They know that Competition Commission 
fines for trying to conceal anticompetitive behaviour they have already engaged 
will likely equal or exceed their present rents. In that case, they should increas
 
131 Other academics have found such an effect (“clean” companies purposely engaging in 
anticompetitive behaviour because of antitrust fines). See Maarten Schinkel and Jan Tuinstra, 
Imperfect competition law enforcement, 24 INT’L J. OF INDUST. ORG. 6, 2006, 
132 Not everyone would likely agree that fines would motivate companies to engage in more 
anticompetitive behaviour. Huschelrath and co-authors ask a bunch of Swiss lawyers if they (the 
lawyers) thought increased penalties under the revised Swiss antitrust law deterred companies. 
Unsurprisingly (and rather self-servingly), these lawyers thought that steeper penalties deterred 
Swiss companies from anticompetitive behaviour. Interestingly, deterrence comes from dawn raids 
and other repressive measures, rather than any attempt to put a flat maximum fine in place à la 
Malaysia. See Kai Huschelrath, Nina Leheyda and Patrick Beschorner, The Deterrent Effect of 
Antitrust Sanctions: Evidence from Switzerland, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 427, 2011.  
133 If the Competition Commission can infinitely compound fines (as we have previous described). 
they can choose exactly the right level of fines to eliminate the incentives we describe in this section.   
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anticompetitive behaviour (and thus rents) in order to make their current rent-
earning “worth while.” For banks that earn a bit more – let’s say RM7 million for 
example – they should actively seek out to engage in rent-earning anticompetitive
behaviour.
 
ks should 
ng their anticompetitive behaviour from the Competition 
ommission.  
6 
rust 
iability 
d
134 The relevant authorities will probably have little mercy on them. So 
they should at least earn the damages they will pay.135 In either case, ban
“invest” in hidi
C
 
What about prison time? In theory, prison time should serve as a deterrent to 
Malaysian bankers engaging in illegal anticompetitive behaviour and then trying to 
hide such behaviour. However, three factors militate against prison times in the Act 
as an effective deterrent. First, the Bank Negara and the police more generally have 
prosecuted relatively little white collar crime – and thrown even fewer in prison.13
The Bank Negara reports relatively few cases on its website, and statistics on the 
prosecution of corporate and white-collar crime in Malaysia suggest that antit
enforcement would take a back seat to other types of law enforcement – like 
fraud.137 Second, high-level bank managers will unlikely attract vicarious l
for collusion, market abuse or obstruction of justice of their sub-ordinates 
(agents).138 As such, prison time does not provide a sufficient enough reason for 
senior managers to put stronger controls in place. Third, even taking the expecte  
. 
 and 
“disutility” of poor treatment in jail. However, even a probable detection 10% 
                                                
financial and psychological costs of imprisonment into account, the benefits of 
anticompetitive behaviour and hiding such behaviour still probably exceed the costs
The total costs of imprisonment may amount to US$250,000 in foregone salary
 
134 The level at which fines start to encourage banks (and other companies) to conceal their 
anticompetitive behaviour will depend on the benefits from collusion, ease of collusion, costs of 
production, costs of concealment and other factors. As we do not have these data for Malaysian 
financial institutions, we can not repeat this analysis. See Maria Avramovich, Prosecuting Cartels: 
Do High Fines Always Contribute to Social Welfare? available online. 
135 Economists argue about whether fines should aim to remove the banks’ revenue from 
anticompetitive behaviour or additionally seek to undue the reduction in consumer welfare. 
Interestingly, in either case, the best policy (for the competition authority) consists of allowing a 
certain low level of anticompetitive behaviour. See Said Souam, Optimal antitrust policy under 
different regimes of fines, 19 INT’L J. OF INDUST.  ORG. 1-2, 2001. Interestingly, even a fine based on 
revenue may still be too low. For an analysis redolent of ours, see Iwan Bos and Maarten Pieter 
Schinkel, On The Scope For The European Commission's 2006 Fining Guidelines Under the Legal 
Maximum Fine, 2 J. OF COMP. L. & ECON 4, 2006.    
136 Few jurisdictions send large numbers of antitrust violators to jail. Even in the US, median jail 
times have not exceeded one year. For data on the US’s enforcement practices, see Beryl Howell, 
Sentencing Of Antitrust Offenders: What Does The Data Show? US SENTENCING COMMISSION 
INTERNAL PAPER, available online. 
137 The Bank Negara reports around 45 cases under investigation at the time of this writing (though 
the Bank does not provide information about the date on which its cases list is updated). See Bank 
Negara, Status of Cases Investigated, available online. Crime statistics in Malaysia are notoriously 
difficult to come by. For an analysis of white collar crime in Malaysia, see Wei-Siew Liew, Chin-
Hong Puah, and Harry Entebang, White-collar crime: a statistical study on its common causes, 2 
INT’L J. OF BUS., MAN., AND SOC. SCI. 4, 2011.  
138 For a survey, see Chee-Wee Lim, Criminal Liability of Companies Survey: Malaysia, 2008, 
available online. 
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lowers that amount to an expected US$25,000.139 Rational Malaysian bank 
managers will engage in illegal anticompetitive behaviour if such anticompetitive 
behaviour raises that bank manager’s value of his or her stock options, commissions, 
and the value of improved chances at a higher paying promotion more than $25,000. 
Putting criminal bank managers in prison won’t encourage compliance with 
the Competition Act as long as the expected benefits of anticompetitive 
behaviour exceed the expected costs. 
 
The most interesting case concerns the revenue-based penalties in the Act. The 
Malaysian Competition Act imposes a maximum limit of 10% of a company’s 
worldwide revenue for financial penalties —applicable on revenues earned over the 
period of the anticompetitive conduct. As Figures 34 show, such limits would be 
unlikely to dissuade Malaysia’s banks. In the case of anticompetitive conduct 
lasting only one year, the first panel shows the profits of the most profitable 
Malaysian banks, after paying a hypothetical 10% revenue fine. The largest banks 
continue to earn profits of over 1 billion ringgit even after deducting 10% of 
the value of these banks’ revenues. As shown by the black boxes above each bar 
in the figure, thepenalties amount to approximately 30% of 2012 profits.  
 
For medium-profit range banks, such fines shrink profits much more dramatically – 
albeit with a greater range of outcomes. AmIslamic’s 2012 profits shrink by 60% 
when its revenues fall by 10%. Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bank’s 
profits, on the other hand, fall by only 18%. Maximum fines hurt these banks – but 
the gains from anticompetitive behaviour may still tempt them more than the 
possibility of penalties imposed by the Competition Commission would dissuade 
them from unlawful but profitable anticompetitive activity.  
 
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
M alayan CIM B Group Public CIM B RHB Capital Bank
Kerjasama 
Hong Leong RHB Bank Hong Leong
Fin.
HSBC 
pr
of
it 
af
te
r f
in
es
 
(m
illi
on
 ri
ng
gi
t)
Figure 34a: Even 10% Revenue Penalties Laugable for Largest Banks 
36% 31%
34%
31%
34% 33% 37% 39% 38% 19%
The f igure show s net income for Malaysia's largest banks in 2012 after subtracting a penalty of 10% of that year's 
revenues. The black boxes above each bar show s the f ine -- as a percent of that year's gross interest and dividend 
income. 
Source: WRDS (2014). 
Fines as a percent of 2012 profits
 
                                                 
139 As we previously discussed, “expected” outcomes relate to the value of a cost or benefit 
multiplied by the probability of that outcome. To take a simple example, a pay-off worth $100 with a 
probability of 50% of occurring would have an expected value of $50.   
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Figure 34b: Penalties for Medium-Earner Banks Still Not Very Dissuasive 
51% 47% 29%
60%
18%
26%
25% 67%
42% 27%
The f igure show s net income for Malaysia's largest banks in 2012 after subtracting a penalty of 10% of that year's 
revenues. The black boxes above each bar show s the f ine -- as a percent of that year's gross interest and dividend 
income. 
Source: WRDS (2014). 
Fines as a percent of 2012 profits
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Figure 34c: For Lowest Earners, the Penalty Imposes Losses on A Range of Banks
7%
70%
119%
61%
417% 1350% 122% 215% 23%
29%
The f igure show s net income for Malaysia's largest banks in 2012 after subtracting a penalty of 10% of that year's 
revenues. The black boxes above each bar show s the f ine -- as a percent of that year's gross interest and dividend 
income. Gray boxes express f ines as a percent of 2012 earnings losses. 
Source: WRDS (2014). 
Fines as a percent of 2012 profits
Fines as a percent of 2012 LOSSES
 
 
The lowest earning Malaysian banks represent the most interesting case for 
analysis – and the bank group most likely to be affected by the Competition 
Commission’s revenue-tied penalties. The Bank of America’s profits in Malaysia 
would fall by 61% in 2012 if the Competition Commission had imposed a 10% 
revenue fine. AmInternational’s profits would not decrease – because its revenue 
had been so low. Competition Commission fines would only significantly adversely 
affect OSK Investment, Kenanga Investment, K & N Kenanga Holdings, Bank 
Muamalat and Al-Rajhiby forcing them into an actual loss.140 If the banks listed in 
Figure 34c also received maximum fines of RM10 million, they would all report net 
losses (negative earnings) in 2012, though none would become insolvent.141 
 
                                                 
140 BNP Paribas and Royal Bank of Scotland already lost money in 2012. As such, Competition 
Commission fines would deepen their losses.  
141 Academics have recently wondered whether various antitrust fine structures would encourage 
bankruptcies – and what effect the threat of bankruptcies might have on anticompetitive behaviour. 
Such ruminations particularly concern the banking sector – as any fine structure which causes 
bankruptcies could undermine general banking sector stability. Fortunately, as such a possibility 
seems highly unlikely in Malaysia, we discuss this issue no further. See Andreas Stephan, The 
Bankruptcy Wildcard in Cartel Cases, CENTRE FOR COMP. POL. WP 06-5, available online.     
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How much money will anticompetitive behaviour likely earn Malaysian banks?  
Figure 35 provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation of such benefits. Net interest 
revenue equalled RM74.3 billion in 2012 and RM19 billion from fees and 
commissions. Thus, total revenue equalledRM93 billion in 2012. We know that 
prices are 25% higher than need to be (according to market power estimates from 
Figure 3). If these higher prices come from anticompetitive behaviour, rents in 
Malaysia’s banking sector come to around RM18.6 billion, under the very liberal 
assumptions we make. We also know that, from data from the EU and US, that 
detection rates hover at about 10% -- with rates of 33% representing extremely 
good outcomes.142 Detection at a very optimistic 10%still means that the expected 
benefit equals about 16.7 billion.143 The rationality (from an economic point of 
view) in hiding such anticompetitive behaviour results from the fact that even if all 
75 Malaysian banks paid the maximum fines for concealing their anticompetitive 
behaviour (thus constituting an “offence”, punishable by a maximum criminal 
penalty of RM10 million),144 and for actually engaging in the anticompetitive 
behaviour (thus constituting an “infringement”/infraction, punishable by a 
maximum civil penalty of 10% of worldwide revenue) equals a total fine payable of 
RM1.68 billion(where RM750 million results from fines for committing the 
‘offence’ of concealment and RM930 results from the 10% payable upon the 
revenue of RM93 billion for “infringements”/“infractions”). Even after Competition 
Commission enforcement, Malaysian banks can still expect (under our simplifying 
assumptions) to earn about RM15 billion in rents. Of course these are simply 
illustrative numbers. However, they show that even with much less market power, 
Malaysian banks would likely have strong incentives not to comply with the 
Competition Act.145 
 
                                                 
142 In the EU, such detection rates hover at about 10%, with significant variance in estimated 
detection rates. The Malaysian Competition Commission (as we previously showed) does not have – 
and will not have for about 20 years – the same effectiveness as its EU counterparts. We give the 
Commission the benefit of the doubt, but assuming a relatively high 10% probability of detection in 
Malaysia. See Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier, and Renaud Legal, Cartels: the Probability of 
Getting Caught in the European Union, BEER PAPER 12, 2008, available online.  
143Renda and colleagues provide quantification of detection rates in Table 2. They tend to exceed 
those estimated by Combe and colleagues. See Andrea Renda, John Peysner, Alan Riley, Barry 
Rodger, Roger Van Den Bergh, Sonja Keske, Luiss Carli, Roberto Pardolesi, Enrico Camilli and 
Paolo Caprile, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and 
potential scenarios, DG COMP/2006/A3/012, available online.  
144Competition Act at art 61(a). 
145 We do not have space to describe why the Competition Act’s revenue penalties and fines are set 
too low to serve as an effective deterrent to anticompetitive behaviour in Malaysia’s banking sector. 
Part of the problem stems from the nature of tying fines to revenue (rather than lost consumer 
surplus). Part of the problem stems from the unique economics of Malaysia’s banking sector. For 
more on the first problem, see Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta, Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis, 
CEPR DISC. PAP. 9290, available online. 
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Figure 35: How Much Rents Can Malaysia’s Bank Expect to Earn? 
RM93 billion total revenue from our bank sample in 2012*
25% likely mark-ups from market power (from figure 3)
RM 18.6billion likely rents earned by Malaysian banks
10% likely detection rate**
RM 16.7billion expected gain before chance to getting caught
RM 750 million maximum fine even if all 75 banks paid max fine 
RM 930 million expected revenue-penalties paid by banks caught***
RM 15 billion expected gain from anticompetitive behaviour at 2012 income
In the figure, we make the pessimistic assumption that banks both engage in anticompetitive behaviour as well as try to hide such behaviour –
thus commiting both “infringements” and “offences” (using the language of the Competition Act).
* Net interest revenue equalled 74.3 billion riggit in 2012 and 19 billion from fees and commissions. 
** the EU and US have detection rates maxing out at 33%. With this detection rate, 90% of banks go unhindered – thus earning almost RM17 
billion in rents. 
*** Ten percent of these banks total revenue equals RM9.3 billion. With a 10% probability of being caught, the expected value of these fines 
comes to 930 million.  
 
 
The Cost of Antitrust Internal Audit in the Malaysian Financial Service Sector 
 
The amount of money banks and other firms will spend on antitrust compliance 
depends on the cost of non-compliance. In other words, banks rationally should 
spend no more money on antitrust controls than they could lose from antitrust 
investigations and prosecutions.146 If the benefits from collusion and market abuse 
exceed the costs from prosecution, companies should rationally engage in 
anticompetitive behaviour.147 Leaving aside the issue of jail time, if the benefits of 
anticompetitive behaviour exceed the costs (in terms of compliance and criminal, 
civil and administrative fines and private action awards), banks will engage in anti-
competitive behaviour.   
 
At first glance, Malaysian banks seem to have little to lose from setting up antitrust 
internal audit programmes and procedures. The cost of antitrust compliance 
programmes will likely exceed US$100,000 or RM330,000 in the first years. Figure 
36 shows a breakdown of these costs. For roughly 70 banks, these costs – if 
banks actually paid them – would amount to RM21.1 million for the banking 
sector. At first glance, an expenditure of RM330,000 per bank to save millions in 
fines and penalties seems like a bargain.  
                                                 
146 Despite over 50 academics writing about individuals’ incentives to follow criminal and civil laws, 
we are still surprised by many policymakers’ refusal to consider the economic aspects of antitrust 
compliance and enforcement. For an early example of such an academic, see Alan Beckenstein and 
Landis Gabel, The Economics of Antitrust Compliance, 52 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 3, 1986. For a more 
recent treatment in firms’ incentives to follow Europe’s antitrust law, see Wouter Wils, THE 
OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW: ESSAYS IN LAW & ECONOMICS, 2002.  
147 For example, Huschelrath finds that US and Dutch antitrust policy works because the benefits of 
antitrust enforcement exceed the costs. Companies in these two jurisdictions face penalties from 
national antitrust enforcement agencies larger than the gains from anticompetitive behaviour. See 
Kai Huschelrath, Is it Worth all the Trouble? The Costs and Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement, 
CENTER FOR EURO. ECON. RES. DIS. PAP. 08-107, 2008, available online. 
 50
 
Figure 36: Compliance Programmes Likely to Top $100,000 in First Years 
 
Element Number man 
days 
Cost per day 
(in ringgit) 
Total cost 
Employee training  
(including material development) 
10 660 660 
Participative “risk register”  2 2,475 4,950 
Whistleblowing 15 1,155 17,325 
Consultations with counsel 5 1,650 8,250 
Internal investigations 25 1,980 49,500 
Risk-based project audits 15 1,980 29,700 
Data monitoring 20 2,475 49,500 
Competitive anti-trust intelligence  30 2,475 74,250 
Industry group monitoring 3 1,650 4,950 
Due diligence on borrowers 40 2,640 105,600 
Total 165 2,125 RM250,625 
* Represents the weighted average by number of man-days.  
Originally worked out in USD and converted to ringgit at RM3.3 to $1.  
Source: based on ICC (2013).  
 
For most banks, such spending does represent a bargain. Yet, for a group of banks 
(or any bank in the wrong year) even these relatively minor compliance costs would 
lead to significant declines in profits and increases in operating costs. Figure 37 
shows the extent to which the antitrust compliance costs described above would 
impact on Malaysian banks’ profits and administrative spending in years in which 
these profits and expenses are particularly vulnerable. For example, in 2011, the 
antitrust compliance programme we described above would result in almost 100% 
of Asian Finance Bank’s net income (profits). Such a compliance programme 
would represent about 8% of Hong Leong’s non-interest spending for 2010. On the 
one hand, Malaysian bank’s profits can generally withstand Competition 
Commission fines.148On the other hand, depending on the year, their profits 
may not even be enough to pay for an adequate antitrust compliance 
programme.  
 
                                                 
148 We remind the reader these fines come about as the result of efforts aimed at concealing 
anticompetitive behaviour or otherwise trying to frustrate the Commission’s activities.). With 
compounding fines, banks and financial firms will find hiding anticompetitive behaviour far less 
profitable.   
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Figure 37: For some banks in some years, even a small increase in compliance
costs could mean significantly reduced profits 
25% 3% 8%
compliance as percent of administrative
expenses
The f igure show s the extent to w hich the "standard" antitrust compliance programme w e defined in the paper 
(costing about RM250,000 in the f irst year) w ould impact on profits and administrative expenses in selected 
years. We chose the years in w hich this expense is less than 10% or -10% to keep the chart readable. We use 
net income for profits and total non-interest expenses. 
Source: WRDS (2014) and authors. 
 
 
Yet, the evidence suggests that banks should spend far less than the amount needed 
to prevent, detect and stop anticompetitive behaviour. Prof. Stephan, using 
historical case studies from the US, argues that the compliance programmes that 
many companies (like banks) use today would not have prevented prosecution in 
the past.149 Given the limited range of employees tempted by the incentives to 
engage in anticompetitive behaviour, a targeted compliance programme may help 
manage compliance-related costs better than a general company-wide programme. 
Figure 38 shows the frequency by which various types of employees have been 
prosecuted for anticompetitive behaviour in the EU. The CEO, President and/or 
Chairman of the Board very frequently serve as defendants in EU antitrust cases. As 
the head of the company often directly and personally engages in the 
company’s anticompetitive behaviour, antitrust internal audit work will 
probably not receive much support.  
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Figure 38: Head of Company and Mid-Level Sales Staff Most Often 
Involved in Antitrust Cases
The figure show s the frequency by w hich various levels of company staff had been prosecuted for
EU antitrust violations. We try to list cases by seniority (from left to right) rather than by frequency. 
* Other staff usually involve a range of senjor executives not directly in marketing and/or sales. 
Source: Stephan (2009)  
                                                 
149 See Andreas Stephan, Hear no Evil, See no Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes may be 
Ineffective at Preventing Cartels, CCP WORKING PAPER 09-09, 2009, available online. 
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Most authors agree that companies like banks will likely adopt very different 
antitrust compliance programmes (and thus engage in differing levels of antitrust 
audits) depending on market and firm-specific factors. Feizi (2011) summarises 
much of this literature in a model of antitrust auditing which we use to illustrate 
some of the issues from the literature in the Malaysian context.150 Different groups 
of banks have different costs – and thus different incentives to mark-up prices 
through anticompetitive practices. High profit banks, according to Feizi’s logic and 
the logic in much of this literature, have either low costs or high rents from 
anticompetitive behaviour. Using Figure 36 to illustrate this logic, banks like 
Malayan Bank, CIMB Group, and Public Bank have either low costs or generate 
profits as the result of collusive rents.151 The implication for antitrust internal audit 
is clear in either case. Highly profitable companies have no incentive to engage in 
antitrust internal audits. If such profits come from lower costs, bank managers have 
nothing to fear from a Malaysian Competition Commission investigation. If such 
profits come from anticompetitive rents, antitrust internal audits would remove 
these profits, create evidence discoverable by the Competition Commission, and tell 
managers something they almost certainly know. The Competition Commission 
will probably not reduce the fine imposed on these companies because they have 
antitrust audit programmes.152 The optimal expenditure on antitrust internal 
audits for these banks equals zero.153 
 
                                                 
150 Feizi’s paper refers to antitrust auditing as investigations conducted by the competition authority. 
Naturally, from an economic perspective, there is little difference between auditing done by 
companies themselves and the government (except for incentives to discover wrong doing and how 
to act on that information). As his paper contains an abstract algebraic model, we formulate some of 
his discussion in the context of Malaysian banking using profit data. Readers should not assume that 
Feizi or we suggest any type of impropriety in Malaysian banking. We use these data for 
illustrative purposes only. See Mehdi Feizi, Optimal Antitrust Auditing and Cartel Pricing, 2011, 
available online.  
151 We do not adjust these profits for loan sizes or report profit rates in order to avoid giving the 
impression that the reader can somehow use the figure to detect collusion in the Malaysian banking 
sector.   
152 For a discussion in the US context, see Joseph Murphy and William Kolasky, The Role of Anti-
Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing Cartel Behaviour, 26 ANTITUST 2, 2012, available 
online. 
153 This assumes the Commission does not engage in discretionary enforcement aimed at increasing 
the final financial impact of penalties and fines (like applying penalties over longer time periods and 
compounding offences).  
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high profit banks have low  costs -- so 
biggest temptation to break cartel and 
low est incentive to engage in antitrust audit
low  profit banks benefit least from collusion - so 
highest incentive to collect evidence via antitrust 
audit 
Figure 39: Majority of Banks Benefitting from Status Quo 
Have Optimal Antitrust Audit Spending of Zero 
The figure illustrates the economic logic contained in Feizi (2009), show ing how  firms can "self-sort", having different 
incentives to collude, detect such collusion internally and among industry peers as w ell as report such collusion to the 
competition authority. Highly profitable banks w ill have strong incentives to conceal profits, so as to appear they belong to 
the low -profit (and thus low  risk of collusion) group. We do not w ish in any way to suggest that banks in this 
graph engage in anticompetitive behaviour. We use the data only to illustrate Feizi's logic. 
 
 
Antitrust audit has a place for low profit firms. If low profits stem from high costs, 
then internal audit can help identify these high costs and maybe inefficiencies 
coming from maladroit attempts to engage in anticompetitive behaviour.154If low 
profits come from relatively unsuccessful anticompetitive behaviour, these 
companies have the least to lose from whistleblowing to the Malaysian Competition 
Commission.155The optimal spending on antitrust internal audits for these 
firms exceeds zero ringgit. 
 
Yet, the data suggest that any time anticompetitive behaviour allows Malaysia’s 
largest banks to markup operating revenues by more than 10%, they should do it.156 
A simple numerical example illustrates the point. Imagine RHB Bank, through 
illegal mark-ups, could earn RM1.2 billion instead of RM1 billion (or a 20% mark-
up) – with an unchangeable quantity of lending. A 10% penalty payment would 
come to RM120 million, with a RM10 million fine increasing that payment to 
RM130 million. After paying the fine, RHB Bank still earns RM1,070 million – or 
                                                 
154 Collusion and abuse of market power, like any business activity, entail costs and have varying 
chances of success. Economists might refer to these non-negligible costs as transactions costs. See 
Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, Transaction Costs of Collusion 
and Organizational Design, USC CLEO RP C01-17, 2001, available online. 
155 Authors like Aubert et al. provide evidence that internal audit may produce evidence which can 
help shield colluding bank and other managers in case of competition commission investigation. In 
this version, such evidence can be brought to the competition authority in order to receive leniency. 
See Cecile Aubert, Patrick Rey, and William E. Kovacic, The impact of leniency and whistle-
blowing programs on cartels, 24 INT’L J. OF IND. ORG. 6, 2006.  
156 Operating revenues refer to income after subtracting costs of services provided. If these costs rise 
as markups increase, then operating revenue may fall. A situation where falling operating profits 
combines with a 10% revenue-based fine would clearly have very large and adverse effects on bank 
profits.   
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70 million more in revenue.157 If we make the unrealistic assumption that their 
current market power comes as the result of illegal activity, then no amount of 
compliance spending would help Malaysian banks increase profits.158 Figure 40 
shows the intuition behind this statement. Malaysia’s largest banks earn revenues 
from interest and fees. Competition Commission penalties of 10% would reduce 
these revenues – and reduce profits even faster. Yet, banks may -- at the margin -- 
decide on the extent which they should “set” the level of increased revenue from 
their anticompetitive behaviour. More anticompetitive behaviour will increase 
revenues. With a maximum 10% limit on penalties, Malaysian banks should 
always set their anticompetitive behaviour (and thus their mark-ups) higher 
than the Malaysian Competition Commission revenue-tied penalty rate.  
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Figure 40: With Mark-Ups of 25%* and Fines of About 15% of Revenues, Malaysian Banks 
Will ALWAYS Have Incentive to Act Anticompetitively and Just Pay the Penalties
net interest
fees and commissions
max Commission fines and penalties
The f igure show s the net interest income and income from fees and commissions for a range of Malaysian banks in 2012 
(above the horizontal axis). In comparison, w e show  the maximum fine of 10% of revenue and a RM10 million f ine applied 
to each bank. The most money the Commission could hope to get in 2012 from any one bank comes to about RM1 billion or 
about RM2 from the entire industry. We naively assume (for the purposes of this example) that costs do not go 
up w ith markups.  
* We refer to 25% markups using the same figure w e have used throughout the paper - as an illustration only. 
Source: WRDS (2014) w ith analysis by authors. 
 
 
Naturally, the amount banks spend on antitrust compliance programmes will depend 
on other banks’ compliance spending. If all banks, except for CIMB Bank (for 
example) increase their spending on antitrust compliance, such spending puts CIMB 
Bank at a disadvantage for three reasons. First, anticompetitive behaviour involving 
CIMB (again only using the name as an example) detected by another bank (like 
Malayan) may put CIMB at a disadvantage. Malayan (as part of the cartel) could 
turn itself in for leniency, channelling the Competition Commission’s investigatory 
and prosecutorial efforts toward CIMB. Second, significant differences in 
                                                 
157 This example depends on a number of factors, like how much increasing prices reduces demand 
for RHB’s loans, if prosecution by the Competition Commission would affect overall demand for 
borrowing, and the bank’s fixed and variable costs (remember that fines come out of bottom line 
profits and not top line revenues). We avoid these complications in our example, to avoid drawing 
attention away from our main point. A simple plot of interest income on loans compared with net 
interest on loans to lending size ratios shows no increase in costs as lending sizes increase. As 
such, costs should not significantly affect the nature of the argument we make in this section.  
158 We cite several times in this paper studies showing markups in the Malaysian banking sector of 
about 25% over marginal costs. We use this figure as a simple heuristic – to think through the effects 
of the Competition Act’s remedies to anticompetitive behaviour in the banking sector. We do not 
suggest these markups come about exclusively as the result of illegal behaviour.  
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compliance spending (after adjusting for the size of loan books and other factors) 
may serve as a red flag to the Competition Commission. When all banks, except 
CIMB, announce antitrust compliance programmes and show significant spending, 
CIMB becomes an obvious antitrust audit target. Third, banks spending significant 
resources on compliance (besides decreasing the potential incidence of 
anticompetitive behaviour) can also hide their illegal activity better. Simply put, 
banks with antitrust compliance programmes will better know what evidence needs 
hiding, tampering, or destroying.159 Antitrust compliance programmes and audit can 
also help encourage changes in illegal behaviour toward less detectable methods of 
engaging in anticompetitive behaviour.160 Banks may play a strategic game in 
which they do not need to completely hide anticompetitive behaviour. They only 
need to hide such behaviour better than their peers and rival banks.161 
 
The data suggest that Malaysian banks’ expenses do not correlate with each other – 
suggesting that banks will unlikely look at each other when deciding on antitrust 
compliance programmes. Figure 41 shows an example of such spending, namely 
looking at the extent to which CIMB’s other operating expenses change as Public 
Bank’s or Malayan Bank’s expenses change. If CIMB changed its spending in 
response to other banks (like Public or Malayan), the figure would show the 
difference in such changes around zero. In other words, if CIMB copied changes in 
other banks’ spending, we would see the lines in the figure hover above and close to 
0%. Instead, we observe significant positive and negative variation in spending vis-
à-vis these other banks. If other operating expenses could serve as a proxy for 
compliance and other related spending, we could conclude that CIMB does not 
simply copy other banks. As shown in the matrix below the figure, we see 
correlations in spending between groups of banks. CIMB Bank’s and CIMB 
Group’s other operating expenses correlate strongly with each other – likely 
reflecting common markets served and corporate spending policies. Similarly, RHB 
Bank’s and RHB Capital’s spending correlate highly with each other. Interestingly, 
Malayan and Public Bank’s other operating expense spending follow each other 
closely (highly correlates) from 2006 to 2012. If we wanted to look at two banks 
whose spending might follow each other, we would look at these two banks.   
 
                                                 
159 We have so little data about evidence tampering (and the destroying of incriminating evidence 
found during corporate self-assessments and audits) because companies need such data to remain 
secret. For a recent case of such behaviour, see Melissa Lipman, EU Court Stands Tough Against 
Tampering In Antitrust Raids, 360LAW, 2012 available online.  
160 The literature has dealt very little with “crime displacement” in antitrust – and even less with the 
role that compliance audit plays in displacing criminal activity into harder to detect channels. For a 
discussion of some of these issues, see Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen, Eds, EXPLAINING 
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION, 2011.   
161 For a more formal description of the “game” of providing signals and information to markets and 
regulators about a firm’s anticompetitive behaviour, see Mohamed Jellal and Said Souam,  A theory 
of antitrust enforcement game, MPRA WP 38343, 2012, available online.  
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Figure 41: Little Evidence of Strategic Spending Between 
CIMB with Malayan and Public Bank 
Malayan
Public Bank
The figure show s the w ay that CIMB Bank's grow th in spending on "other operating expenses" dif fers from grow th in
spending by Malayan Bank and Public Bank. For example, in 2007, CIMB's operating expenses grew  more quickly than
Public Bank's or Malayan's. By 2011, both Public and Malayan had faster grow ing operating expenses. The volatility
in these lines suggests that CIMB is not pegging its operating expense grow th rates to match those of Malayan or 
Public Bank. These data do not remove the effects of common market features w hich may require banks to change 
spending together for reasons other than just copying each other.  
Source: WRDS (2014). 
 
  CIMB Bank  CIMB Group  Malayan  Public Bank  RHB  RHB Capital 
CIMB Bank  1.0  0.8  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0 
CIMB Group  0.8  1.0  ‐0.2  0.2  0.1  ‐0.1 
Malayan  0.0  ‐0.2  1.0  ‐0.9  0.3  0.3 
Public Bank  0.3  0.2  ‐0.9  1.0  ‐0.2  ‐0.2 
RHB  0.1  0.1  0.3  ‐0.2  1.0  0.8 
RHB Capital  0.0  ‐0.1  0.3  ‐0.2  0.8  1.0 
The matrix above shows the correlation in “other operating expenses” from 2006 to 2012 for the banks shown. We   
highlight correlations greater than 0.75 and do not make any special indications of statistical significance.  
 
So how much money should Malaysian banks spend on antitrust compliance 
programmes and audit work? We have shown that such spending depends on the 
amount of money banks would give up by reducing anticompetitive behaviour, the 
level of such spending by other banks, the extent of Competition Commission 
oversight (probability of detection), and penalties if/when these banks are 
investigated by the Competition Commission. Compliance managers should set 
the level and change of compliance spending to maximise the rents from 
anticompetitive behaviour while simultaneously minimising the risk of 
Competition Commission detection. We describe this process in Figure 42 (which 
non-technical readers should feel free to ignore). Deciding antitrust compliance 
spending each year – including spending on antitrust internal audit – depends on 
five factors. First, the change in compliance spending depends on the level of 
compliance spending.162Second, compliance spending depends on size of lending. 
Third, compliance spending by one bank depends strategically on compliance 
spending by other banks. Fourth, spending naturally depends on the probability of 
detection and size of potential fines.163
                                                 
162 Such change likely looks like an inverted-U, with banks having no or little compliance speeding 
up their spending, while big spenders continuing to spend a lot to keep their compliance levels in 
place.  
163 We spend a great deal of time criticising the penalty structure in the Competition Act – without 
proposals for its replacement. As we look at the best audit regime given the current rules, we do not 
focus on improving the current system. For some recent discussions of such optimal fines, see 
Evgenia Motchenkov, Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic 
setting ,EURO. J. OF OP. RES. 189, 2008. See also John Connor and Douglas Miller, Determinants of 
EC Antitrust Fines for Members of Global Cartels, LEAR CONFERENCE PAPER, 2009, available 
online. 
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Figure 42: The Maths of Deciding on the Best Level of Annual Antitrust 
Compliance Spending 
 
How much should Malaysian banks spend on antitrust compliance and audit work? We previously 
provided a back-of-the-envelope budget for spending, based on the cost of several popular 
compliance programme activities (like training, operating whistleblowing programmes, and so 
forth). But such an estimate ignores the gains from banks engaging in anticompetitive behaviour – 
and using compliance spending to help hide their gains from the Competition Commission. So 
how much should Malaysian banks spend each year on compliance (and antitrust audit)? What 
will total spending look like? The change in antitrust compliance and audit spending ( ) will 
depend on a number of factors, as explained below. 
•
y
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parameter and  
expected sign 
description 
snowball effect          γ 
positive 
expect positive, as compliance costs increase, banks must spend 
increasingly more to detect harder to identify risks and maintain 
current compliance levels.  
copying effect           ϕ 
positive 
expect positive, as other banks increase compliance spending, 
need to increase own spending rises.  
size effect                  θ 
positive 
as lending sizes increase, need to conduct compliance activities 
over larger numbers of customers and book sizes.  
rent effect                  β 
negative 
as rents come from mark-ups on quantity, higher value of 
quantities of lending contribute to anticompetitive rents. 
deterrence effect       α 
positive 
positive, as Competition Commission gets better at detecting, 
investigating and prosecuting anticompetitive behaviour in 
Malaysia’s banking sector, banks want to spend more. 
 
The best profile of compliance spending depends (unsurprisingly) on the rents banks can earn 
from anticompetitive behaviour and the way that compliance spending helps safeguard those rents.  
Readers familiar with math will see immediately that figuring out the change in compliance 
spending y works out to maximizing the rents from lending βθx. The maximum penalties of 10% 
of revenue and RM10 million drive much compliance spending behaviour in the model.  
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The figure below shows the way that the optimal compliance spending changes as banks’ ability to 
markup revenues rises. For any markups at all, banks will need to spend a large amount of money 
(roughly RM1 million). The Competition Commission can remove even tiny rents with very large 
fines and penalties. As markups increase, banks can expect to keep RM1 million in profits for each 
extra point of markups. Banks do not want to spend all their rents on the compliance costs of 
hiding revenue (or eliminating these rents through law-abiding behaviour). Thus additional 
spending on compliance falls. However, at about 8% mark ups, banks worry about losing the 
infra-marginal rents. Namely, they would not be willing to ramp up compliance spending to keep 
RM3 million in rents. However, by the time these rents come to around RM8 million, banks would 
spend more money to ensure they do not both lose the rents and suffer from punitive fines which 
exceed their gains.  
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The figure show s the estimated optimal spending on compliance-related activities of a Malaysian bank earning $1 billion 
in gross revenue. We assume maximium revenue-based penalties of 10%, RM10 in maximum fines, detection 
probability of 10% and that compliance spending affects the probability of detection. 
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This simulation highlights several interesting features about antitrust compliance spending over 
time when firms react strategically to each others’ spending and to Malaysian Competition 
Commission surveillance. First, firms tend to react the same way over time – seeing benefits from 
working together. In other words, equilibrium spending on compliance levels out and does not 
vary over time because banks try to “game” each other’s compliance spending. Second, the size of 
lending does not influence compliance spending behaviour very much. Small banks need to worry 
about the RM10 fines more than the 10% revenue-tied penalty. Larger banks worry more about the 
revenue-tied penalty. In either case, the profile and approximate amount of compliance spending 
remains the same. Third, the size of compliance spending does not affect the yearly change in such 
spending. The economics of compliance spending relies on the size of anticompetitive rents and 
the probability of Competition Commission detection far more than the size of compliance 
spending. The difference (or change) in compliance spending relates to changes in the probability 
in detection. As such, changes – rather than levels – of compliance spending drive incentives to 
invest in antitrust audits.  
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What effect would leniency have on incentives to spend on antitrust compliance? 
The Malaysian Competition Act’s leniency provisions (combined with the low 
maximum fine) would likely further encourage banks to conceal, rather than 
discover through internal audit, anticompetitive behaviour. Banks providing 
information to the Competition Commission about their own anticompetitive 
behaviour may receive “a reduction of up to a maximum of one hundred percent of 
any penalties which would otherwise have been imposed.”164 Interestingly, when a 
leniency programme combines with a fixed fine, the result may solidify rather than 
destabilise cartels.165 In other jurisdictions like the US and EU, leniency 
programmes help destabilise cartels and provide incentives to report anticompetitive 
behaviour to local antitrust authorities. Such leniency programmes make sense 
when the severity of fines and punishments increase as the value of anticompetitive 
behaviour (and/or harms from such activity) rises.   
 
In Malaysia’s case, leniency programmes – combined with low maximum 
penalties – encourage companies to collude and hide their collusion. Leniency 
reduces the expected penalties and fines banks would likely pay – as the possibility 
always exists to turn themselves or others in to reduce these penalties.166 Figure 43 
shows the effect of leniency programmes on the expected value of fines paid by 
cartel members engaging in anticompetitive behaviour. In the figure, we aggregate 
the value of financial penalties (paid as “infringements” of the Competition Act) 
and “offences” (such as trying to obstruct the Competition Commission from doing 
its work).167 For a probability of detection at 50% or less, the value of rents needed 
to make collusion worthwhile starts at about RM50 million and maxes out at about 
RM83 million. As the threat of Competition Commission enforcement increases, 
cartel members need higher levels of compensation to offset potential fines. Even if 
the value of illegal market power came in at only 1% of the RM16 billion we 
previously estimated, the RM160 million in rents would make such collusion 
economically viable given the likely probability of Competition Commission 
detection in the near future. Anything banks do to form and hide collusion can 
only increase their profits – up until they experience an 80% probability of 
                                                 
164 Competition Act at 41(1).  
165 Feizi for example finds that leniency programmes can destabilise cartels, as individual members 
have incentives to receive amnesties. However, in the face of Malaysia’s relative low fines, leniency 
actually works against the incentives found in other jurisdictions. See Mehdi Feizi, Optimal Antitrust 
Auditing and Cartel Pricing, available online. 
166 As an example, imagine Alliance Bank would pay a RM10 million fine for abuse of market 
power. With a 50% probability of receiving leniency for turning itself in right before an investigation, 
the expected value of the fine comes to RM5 million – even if the Commission decided on the full 
fine of RM10 million.  
167 From an economic point of view, our analysis does not depend on whether banks make payments 
because of “infringements” or “offences.” We assume throughout the paper that financial penalties 
imposed on anticompetitive behaviour and fines for obstructing the Competition Commission occur 
together. We could assume banks (financial firms) do not engage in obstruction of justice-style 
offences without changing the results of our analysis. Indeed, removing these fines from our 
calculations would make anticompetitive behaviour even more profitable!    
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detection. At that point, the expected gain in rents could not offset the likely loss 
from Commission fines.  
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Figure 43: Leniency Actually Encourages Larger Rents and Investment
in Avoiding Detection as well as Decreases Fine per Cartel Member
The f igure show s the size of rents required to make the RM10 million fine per cartel member w orth w hile. We divide the 
10 million (the size of the fine) by the probability that cartel members can keep the value of their rents. We assume that 
at 50% probability of detection, cartels decide to seek leniency (w ith 2 members confessing and 3 paying the maximum
fine). The marginal benefit from compliance programmes w hich reduce the probability of detection are show n in black.
For example, a compliance programme w hich reduces the probability of detection by 40% earns RM16 million extra in 
rents.  
 
Compliance costs which hide, rather than reduce, anticompetitive behaviour 
become more profitable as they succeed in reducing the probability of a 
Competition Commission investigation. For low probabilities of detection, the value 
of compliance and internal audit work aimed at making collusion harder to spot has 
little return (as shown by the black line in the figure).168 At relatively high 
probabilities of detection, for programmes which decrease the changes of a 
Competition Commission investigation by 50% or more, these programmes will pay 
off from RM41 million to RM250 million.  
 
Leniency also has the effect of lowering the fine paid per cartel (or collusion group) 
member. In the figure, we illustrate this point by assuming that, after a 50% 
probability of detection, 2 of the 5 group members agree to blow the whistle on the 
cartel. These 2 members receive leniency and the other 3 members pay the 
maximum fine of RM10 million. The RM30 million in fines paid to the 
Competition Commission comes to RM6 per cartel member. Leniency has 
decreased the expected maximum fine payment by 40%.169 Leniency can also 
increase collusion, both by reducing the number of disadvantaged parties outside 
                                                 
168 The black line shows the marginal change in the green line (or the value of rents needed to make 
collusion worthwhile). This marginal change in the black line shows the effect of lowering the 
probability of detection by 10% at each probability level of detection. At high probabilities of 
detection, firms clearly have strong interests in lowering that probability – making the value of rents 
needed to make collusion worthwhile so much the lower.   
169 Harrington and Chang provide even more dire evidence suggesting that leniency programmes can 
undermine antitrust enforcement efforts. In their study, they find that when “leniency cases are just 
as intensive to prosecute and penalties are sufficiently low [certainly the case in Malaysia], then a 
leniency program is not only ineffective but actually raises the cartel rate because of its deleterious 
effect on non-leniency enforcement.” See Joseph Harrington and Myong-Hun Chang, Endogenous 
Antitrust Enforcementin the Presence of a Corporate Leniency Program, 2012, available online.  
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the cartel, and by encouraging the creation of multiple cartel “ringleaders” who 
have the clout needed to benefit from these leniency programmes.170 
Wouldn’t private rights of action affect our analysis? In theory, private rights of 
action – where victims and competitors can sue the members of an illegal 
agreement or abuser of market power– can increase the penalties for 
anticompetitive behaviour.171 Private action could also increase the probability of 
detection, as private parties may have stronger profit-based motives to expose 
anticompetitive behaviour than government actors.172 If a competition authority 
does not have the capacity to vigorously investigate and prosecute anticompetitive 
behaviour (like seemingly in Malaysia’s case), private action can fill this gap.173 
 
Private rights of action probably won’t change the economics of antitrust 
compliance in Malaysia – at least in the short-term. In order for private action to 
work in Malaysia, potential litigants need court systems which provide “profits” (in 
the form of awards) for detecting and complaining about anticompetitive behaviour.  
Yet, such profits seem extremely uncertain. Persons or companies who sue banks 
engaging in anticompetitive behaviour risk paying long and drawn-out litigation 
costs if they lose the case. Court-awards would only compensate plaintiffs for their 
time and expenses; and the burden of proof lies squarely on the plaintiff’s shoulders. 
Even if the bank directly admitted guilt to the Competition Commission, persons 
bringing competition-related lawsuits would need to show that the financial firm’s 
activity directly led to his or her loss and justify the sum he or she asked the court 
for.174 Thus, litigants looking to profit from suing banks for their anticompetitive 
behaviour face enormous uncertainty and even the possibility of bankruptcy (if 
lawyer and other fees exhausts plaintiffs’ financial reserves while the case unfolds). . 
                                                 
170 The literature has not settled the question on whether leniency programmes help or hinder a 
competition authority’s work. From an internal audit perspective, leniency programmes create the 
evidence needed to help qualify for such leniency. On the other hand, leniency reduces the 
deterrence effect that stiff penalties use to encourage internal audit in the first place. See Georg 
Clemens and Holger Rau, Do Leniency Policies Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence, DICE 
WP 130, 2014, available online. See also Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq and 
Giancarlo Spagnolo, Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment, CEPR DP7417, 
2009. 
171 In evidence from the US, Lande and Davis find that private action resulted in $30 billion in 
recoveries and other damages paid for anticompetitive behaviour, in contrast with the roughly $4.5 
billion in government penalties imposed. See Robert Lande and Joshua Davis, Comparative 
Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, U. OF 
SAN FRAN. LAW RES. PAP. 2010-17, 2010, available online.  
172 Renda and co-authors amass a large amount of evidence showing that private actions can help 
competition authorities, both find anticompetitive behaviour and provide strong incentives to 
contribute evidence for government action. See Andrea Renda, John Peysner, Alan Riley, Barry 
Rodger, Roger Van Den Bergh, Sonja Keske, Luiss Carli, Roberto Pardolesi, Enrico Camilli and 
Paolo Caprile, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and 
potential scenarios, DG COMP/2006/A3/012, at Table 3, available online.  
173 McAfee and co-authors find a range of cases where private action may effectively replace 
ineffective government action in enforcing a country’s antitrust rules. See Preston McAfee,  Hugo M. 
Mialon, and Sue Mialon, Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis, 92 J. OF PUB. 
ECON. 10-11, 2008.  
174 For a fuller discussion of issues, see Aimee Goldstein, Elizabeth Morony, James Hosking, and 
Sarah Keene, Private Antitrust Remedies, In GLOBAL COUNSEL – COMPETITION HANDBOOK, 2010.  
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Moreover, the data suggest that antitrust cases appearing in Malaysia’s courts 
would not be completely adjudicated based on the merits of the case. Figure 
44compares – in scatterplot format – two popular indices of legal and judicial 
integrity. We show scores for all countries ranked by both the World Bank and 
Global Integrity. Only one other country (Morocco) scores lower than Malaysia for 
rule of law and judicial independence.175 
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Figure 44: Malaysia Has Second Least Reliable Judiciary (After Morocco) Among
Countries Analysed by Global Integrity and World Bank
Malaysia
The figure show s a comparison of tw o measures of likely judicial independence and reliability. The x-axis show  Global 
Integrity scores related to the question "is the judiciary able to act independently." These numbers broadly follow  scores 
related the extent of corruption in the judiciary. The y-axis show s general "rule of law " scores from the World Bank's 
Governance Indicators. We show  data for 2010, the latest year available from both data sources for Malaysia,.  
Source: Global Integrity (2010) and World Bank (2010).  
 
If any group of banks would benefit from antitrust compliance programmes, 
politically connected banks look like a sub-segment which would benefit from 
antitrust audits. We previously showed evidence that political connections between 
banks and/or companies can help facilitate anticompetitive behaviour. We can not 
know if these connections cause anticompetitive behaviour. However, some 
evidence suggests that companies with Board staff having high level political 
connections tend to have statistically significantly higher audit fees.176 Gul argues 
that politically connected companies had significantly higher audit fees because of 
higher levels of perceived or actual improprieties committed by politically 
connected firms. When capital controls closed down foreign investor of Malaysian 
companies, the need to correct for and show fewer misdeeds decreased. As we 
discussed earlier, politically connected firms in Malaysia have statistically 
significant differences from other firms in terms of cost of capital, audit costs, and 
compliance with codes of corporate governance.   
 
                                                 
175 We have no interest in casting aspersions on Malaysia’s judicial sector. Whether true or not, 
many Malaysian businesses would see the courts as an unreliable means of fighting anticompetitive 
behaviour in their industry. Such inefficiency may not stem from corruption, as Malaysians 
themselves consider the courts to have low levels of corruption. See Global Corruption Report 2007, 
2007, available online. 
176See Ferdinand Gul, Auditors' Response to Political Connections and Cronyism in Malaysia, 44 J. 
OF ACCOUNT. RES. 5, 2006.  
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Figure 44: Political Connections Increases Need for Audits, Lack of 
External Oversight Increases Audit "Modifications"
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The figure show s mean audit costs (in the thousands of ringgit) for Malaysian companies w ith political connections and 
those w ithout. We show  in the black boxes above each bar the proportion of audits "w ith modifications." 
Source: Gul (2013). 
 
 
The audit premium in audits of Malaysian politically-connected companies points 
to a role for antitrust audits in these companies. First, screening companies by the 
extent of their political connections provides an easy way for the Competition 
Commission and third-parties (engaging in private action) to detect anticompetitive 
behaviour. Given this perceived increased probability of anticompetitive behaviour, 
antitrust audit may help reduce the likelihood of an antitrust prosecution.177Second, 
if collusion occurs because company staff continue to view such collusion as 
justified industrial policy, internal audit can help change this mindset.178 
Particularly for government-linked companies, anticompetitive behaviour may 
represent a throw-back to the old way of doing things.179 Third, more intense 
antitrust audits may help reassure investors and other partners about the probity of 
managers of politically controlled banks and companies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the economics of compliance, Malaysian financial institutions 
(particularly banks) should mostly ignore the Competition Act.180 The data show 
that Malaysian banks probably benefit from anticompetitive behaviour – earning 
about 15 RM billion in rents even after paying the penalties and fines envisioned in 
the Act. Political and family connections likely facilitate anticompetitive behaviour 
in corporate Malaysia – if not in the banking sector specifically (though we have no 
                                                 
177 We have argued that antitrust compliance and audit spending should relate to probability of 
detection by the Competition Commission and fines/penalties. Because political connections (rightly 
or wrongly) increase this probability, the value of antitrust audit increases significantly.  
178 We do not argue that industrial policy (state policies helping particular sectors) has no place in 
Malaysia. However, following other countries, such aid should be monitored and (in the words of the 
OECD) “competitively neutral.” See OECD, Discussion on Corporate Governance and the Principle 
of Competitive Neutrality for State-Owned Enterprises, 2009, available online.  
179 For the tensions between new competition norms and Malaysia’s legacy of industrial policy, see 
Cassey Lee, Industrial Policy and Competition Policy in Malaysia, PRESENTATION AT THE EAST 
ASIA COMPETITION POLICY FORUM, 2005, available online.  
180 We make this observation as a way of attracting readers’ attention to the incentive structure given 
by the Competition Act – not as an incitation to commit crime. Strictly following the incentives laid 
out in the Act may cause Malaysian bank managers to engage in criminally negligent behaviour – a 
point which takes us outside the bounds of the current paper.  
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evidence of specific illegal behaviour). Because the Malaysian Competition 
Commission will likely lack the resources to investigate and prosecute anti-
competitive behaviour in Malaysia’s banking industry – banks’ best response to the 
Act probably consists of ignoring it. Maximum fines of 10 million ringgit and 
revenue-based penalties capped at 10% of world-wide revenues mean that banks 
have strong incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour and just pay the low 
fines. Because of such perverse incentives, the best compliance programme for 
banks in Malaysia likely consists of actions which avoid detection rather than 
stopping anticompetitive behaviour. In theory, provisions in the Competition Act 
which potentially allow for the disaggregation of competition infractions and 
drawing out of financial penalties (technically “infringements” in the language of 
the Act) may allow the Competition Commission to set the optimal financial 
penalty – defusing many of the points made in this paper. Future cases will test the 
Commission’s resolve to vigorously detect and then sufficiently sanction financial 
sector firms to ensure appropriate levels of compliance and thus enhancing 
competition in the sector to the benefit of the consumers of financial services and 
potentially to the Malaysian economy as a whole.   
 
What does this mean for antitrust compliance and internal audit in Malaysia’s banks? 
First, only a narrow set of banks have financial incentives to engage in antitrust 
compliance and audit activities. Internal auditors looking to work on antitrust issues 
should focus on those banks. Second, antitrust audit fees for most banks will 
probably equal zero. For banks with the economic incentives to engage in antitrust 
audit, audit fees would be higher than usual. In some cases, these higher fees would 
go toward finding and removing easy-to-detect anticompetitive activity. In other 
cases, these fees would help provide assurance that politically connected and family 
firms do not engage in illegal anticompetitive behaviour. Third, recommendations 
aimed at decreasing anticompetitive behaviour may run counter to the strong 
incentives provided by the Competition Act for even non-colluding firms to 
increase the scope of their anticompetitive behaviour. Fourth, discretionary 
manoeuvring by the Competition Commission to increase penalties through 
drawing out infringement periods and disaggregating infringements and imposing 
maximum allowable civil penalties may make antitrust internal audit more valuable 
to financial service firms in Malaysia. If the Competition Commission needs to 
apply maximum fines and take a liberal view as to the period under which 
anticompetitive behaviour occurred in order to set penalties to their most dissuasive 
levels, such an enforcement strategy represents a serious risk that internal auditors 
must take seriously. The result is a challenging antitrust internal audit environment 
in Malaysia in the years ahead – the real cost of antitrust law to Malaysia’s financial 
services sector! 
 
 
 
 
 65
 
Appendix I: Draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank Negara 
and the Competition Commission 
 
As described in this paper’s main text, shared competence for monitoring 
anticompetitive behaviour between the Competition Commission and the Bank 
Negara poses several audit risks. Internal auditors on antitrust engagements may 
miss guidance provided by one of these regulators. They may also under-estimate 
risk of enforcement (regulatory risk) – given such shared competence. As we also 
described in the main paper, the Bank Negara may issue antitrust guidelines and 
controls which the Competition Commission does not view as authoritative – or 
providing relief from investigation and prosecution even when followed. We offer 
the following template Memorandum or Understanding between the Bank Negara 
and the Competition Commission in order to make antitrust internal audit in 
Malaysia cheaper, easier and more reliable.181 
 
Preliminaries 
 
1. Purpose of this Memorandum. This Memorandum of Understanding shall clarify 
potentially conflicting, overlapping and inadequately defined shared competence for 
enforcing provisions from Malaysia’s competition law – as enshrined in instruments 
such as the 2010 Competition Act and 2012 Financial Services Act.   
 
2. Parties to the Memorandum. This Agreement shall cover the Bank Negara and 
the Competition Commission.  
 
3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Memorandum,  
 
a) anticompetitive behaviour – shall mean any anticompetitive behaviour 
defined chapters 1 and 2 of the Competition Act or provisions of foreign 
legislation with impacts on Malaysia’s financial institutions,  
 
b) anticompetitive effects – effects of behaviour prohibited in the Competition 
Act, and as defined in chapters 1 and 2,  
 
c) financial institutions – shall cover any of the institutions defined in the 
Financial Services Act,  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
181 Some banks – like association-structure banks and Islamic institutions – may need to follow rules 
besides the Bank Negara’s (and provisions enshrined in the Financial Services Act). We ignore this 
complexity. The Memorandum we provide here provides the general principles for cooperation 
which may be extended as needed.   
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Provisions Governing Surveillance and Investigation 
 
4. Market Surveillance. As part of its existing market surveillance, the Bank Negara 
shall take primary responsibility for monitoring banking markets for potential and 
actual anticompetitive behaviour. Such surveillance does not exclude the 
Competition Commission from engaging in similar surveillance – using media 
monitoring, statistical analysis (data-mining) or other methods.  
 
5. Definition of Relevant Market. For the purposes of implementing the 
Competition Commission’s Guidelines on defining markets, the Competition 
Commission shall consult with the Bank Negara before applying any definition of a 
Relevant Market.  
 
6. Investigations. Given the complex nature of anticompetitive behaviour in the 
financial sector, the Bank Negara shall: 
 
a) take the lead on all investigations initiated by the Competition Commission,  
 
b) use any agreements with domestic or foreign law enforcement agencies in 
obtaining evidence for illegal anticompetitive behaviour defined in the 
Competition Act, and 
 
c)  rely on Competition Commission any staff or other resources as needed.  
 
7. Dealing with the Bank Negara’s conflict of interest. If the Competition 
Commission thinks the Bank Negara does not engage in adequate antitrust 
surveillance and/or investigation of Financial Institutions, the Commission may – 
using the powers provided by the Competition Act – take the lead in such work 
directly or (as allowed by law) engage a third-party to engage in such work on the 
Commission’s behalf.   
 
Cooperation on the Application of Antitrust Remedies 
 
8. Opinion from Bank Negara on Financial Penalties. In deference to the Bank 
Negara’s role and expertise in promoting financial stability, the Competition 
Commission shall consult with the Bank Negara on fines and penalties applied to 
Financial Institutions.  
 
9. Penalty Application Schedules. In case extremely unfavourable penalties threaten 
the liquidity or capitalisation of a Financial Institution (as deemed by the Bank 
Negara), the Competition Commission may work with the Bank Negara on aspects 
of applying the penalty (such as timing, payment schedules and so forth) in order to 
reduce effects on Malaysia’s banking and financial markets.  
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10. Double jeopardy. In case the Bank Negara creates rules and penalties around 
practices which may relate to anticompetitive behaviour by Financial Institutions, 
the Competition Commission shall review these rules and proposed penalties.  
 
11. Action on inadequate regulations. For any rules with penalties the Competition 
Commission considers inadequate, the Competition Commission will issue a 
statement on its website advising Financial Institutions that the Competition 
Commission may impose additional penalties.   
 
12. Penalties Imposable by the Bank Negara. The Bank Negara may, without the 
consent of the Competition Commission, impose additional penalties on Financial 
Institutions or their agents, as allowed in the Financial Services Act. Such penalties 
may include additional fines, revocation of professional or banking licenses and 
other penalties.  
 
Dealing with potentially anticompetitive rulemaking 
 
13. Review of anticompetitive Bank Negara rulemaking. The Bank Negara shall, 
upon request by the Competition Commission, review its own regulations which 
encourage collusion or other forms of anticompetitive behaviour as defined in the 
Competition Act.  
 
14. Scope of review. The review, described in article 14, may cover any number of 
regulations, with the Bank Negara having: 
 
a) up to 120 calendar days to report the results of requests covering more than 3 
specific provisions regulations, and 
 
b) up to 30 calendar days to report the results of requests covering 3 or less 
specific provisions.  
 
15. Action on anticompetitive regulations. Should the Competition Commission 
decide that a regulation encourages anticompetitive behaviour by Financial 
Institutions, the Bank Negara shall revise the regulation so as to remove the 
anticompetitive effect of the regulation (while keeping its public policy objective 
intact).   
 
Dealing with potentially harmful effects of competition policy on banking 
stability 
 
16. Provisions for Private Action. The Bank Negara may, when assessing capital 
adequacy, liquidity and other prudential measures, consider the effects of potential 
private litigation on Financial Institutions’ balance sheets.  
 
17. Training about measures to reduce effects of antitrust litigation on Financial 
Institutions’ balance sheets. The Bank Negara or the Competition Commission may 
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provide training to Financial Institution staff on preparing resolution plans, 
monitoring risks and other work to assist such staff prepare for such potential 
litigation.  
 
Dealing with anti-trust oversight of self-regulating organisations 
 
18. Regulation of professionals engaging in banking and financial activity. For any 
professionals belonging to self-regulating organisations and associations licensed 
by the Bank Negara, the Bank Negara shall periodically review these organisation’s 
regulations to assess potential for use to restrict competition.  
 
19. Competition Commission’s oversight of Bank Negara’s supervision of self-
regulating organisations. During its regular surveillance of self-regulating 
organisations in Malaysia’s financial sector, the Competition Commission may 
censure the Bank Negara publicly for failing to ensure that these self-regulating 
organisations remove regulations which may have anticompetitive effects.   
 
Foreign cooperation 
 
20. Co-operation on foreign antitrust cases. In cases where foreign law enforcement 
agencies request assistance or require mutual legal assistance, the Competition 
Commission shall represent Malaysia’s lead counterpart for these foreign 
counterparts.  
 
21. Duty to Inform Bank Negara in International Antitrust Cases. The Competition 
Commission shall copy an assigned representative of the Bank Negara on all 
communications with foreign competition agencies on matters or cases involving 
the banking and/or financial sector.  
 
Other provisions 
 
22. Guidelines and Advice for Banks. The Competition Commission shall release a 
general toolkit for bank internal auditors by 4 March, 2015. The Bank Negara may 
follow up with specific guidelines and controls for financial institutions it regulates 
in close consultation with third parties (like the Malaysian Bankers Association, 
IMMB) and the Competition Commission.  
 
23. Duty to Inform the Public. Unless preventing by legislation protecting Financial 
Institutions’ privacy, the Competition Commission shall – without consulting the 
Bank Negara -- post information about antitrust investigations targeted at Financial 
Institutions. Such information may contain as much, or as little, information as 
deemed appropriate by the Competition Commission.  
 
24. Whistleblower protection. The Competition Commission shall have the 
obligation – as defined in the 2010 Whistleblower Protection Act – to protect 
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whistleblowers in Financial Institutions providing specifically information about 
anticompetitive behaviour.  
 
Final Provisions 
 
25. Additional Members to this Agreement. The Parties may agree, by unanimous 
consent, to allow other parties to join the Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
26. Execution. This Memorandum of Understanding shall come into effect upon 
signature of the Parties below, with both Parties placing a copy of this 
Memorandum on their respective webpages.  
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Name (for Competition Commission) 
 
_____________________________      
date 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Name (for Bank Negara)    
 
_____________________________      
date 
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